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Abstract
This Note focuses on the reasonableness of placing the sovereignty argument at the forefront
of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) debate instead of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Single Market and Economy (CSME) argument. The reason being is the CSME cannot exist
without the CCJ. Part I discusses the background of both the CCJ & the CSME. Part II analyzes
the arguments of sovereignty and the CSME for the establishment of the CCJ. Part III advocates
that it is wise to argue rationally, in today’s age of globalization, rather than emotionally.
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USING ONE'S HEAD TO SUSTAIN ONE'S HEART:
A NEW FOCUS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
Neil Dennis*
INTRODUCTION
"A wise man should have money in his head,
but not in his heart."'
Amidst the clear sea water and warm tropical breeze of Ja-
maica, two men stood in a courthouse to hear, for the first time,
that they had been convicted of murder.2 They were both sen-
tenced to death and their executions were scheduled for March
7, 1991.' The defendants, Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan, however,
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helped clarify' the issues in this Note, especially Professor Chantal Thomas and Dr.
David Berry. I thank those who have had great influence on my writing skills, particu-
larly the Honorable Denny Chin and Professor Roger Riendeau. Of course, my deepest
gratitude goes out to the editors and staff of Fordham International Law Journal, Vol-
ume XXVI, especially Julie Turner (a wonderful and caring person in every respect,
and the best darn Notes & Articles Editor ever), Cara Hirsch, Inna Nazarova, Julie
Wald, and Michele Totah. Honorable mention is given to Ms. Jessica Darpino (thanks
in advance for reading this Note "cover to cover"). Finally, 1 would like to acknowledge
a certain cosmic force that only I, and one other, know simply as "ZOHA."
This Note is dedicated to my fiancee, Wendy, for her infinite patience, understand-
ing, and love (traits that all hard working people could only ever hope for in a spouse).
1. Jonathan Swift [Unknown source].
2. See Hucti RAWLINS, THE CARIBIBEAN COURT OFJUSTICE: TIE HisITORY AND ANALY-
sis OF THE DFBATE 6 (2000), available at www.caricom.org/expframes2.htm (summariz-
ing facts of Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney General of Jamaica, where two defendants,
Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan, were convicted of murder in 1979). See also Giselle Reid,
The Legacy of Colonialism: A Hindrance to Self-Deternination, 10 ToURO INr'L L. REV. 277,
293 (2000) (reporting that Pratt and Morgan committed murder in 1977).
3. See Laurence Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations 7 "heoy
And The Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1832, 1869 (2002) (stating that in january 1979, Pratt and Morgan were sentenced
to death). See aLso RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 6 (stating that defendants' executions had
been scheduled to take place on March 7, 1991).
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managed to stall their execution by petitioning their case to ap-
pellate courts and human rights commissions.' They claimed
that issuing the death penalty after such a long delay, during
which they were held in sub-human conditions on death row,5
was an infringement of their constitutional rights not to be sub-
ject to torture or degrading punishment."
Eventually, this case was heard by Jamaica's highest court of
appeals, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England
(the "Privy Council").v This Court held that the prolonged delay
in carrying out the sentence amounted to an infringement of
the prisoners' constitutional rights.' Accordingly, the Court
commuted the sentences of both Pratt and Morgan to life im-
prisonment.' In addition to this ruling, the Court also set out a
five-year deadline between sentence and execution, and held
that any case in which execution takes place for more than five
years after the sentence is sufficient grounds for finding inhu-
4. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 6 (stating that delay was caused by Pratt and Morgan
through their appeals and petitions to courts and human rights commissions, like
United Nations Human Rights Committee ("UNHRC") and Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights ("IACHR")). See alsoJ. M.A. De La Bastide, The Casefor a Carib-
bean Court of Appeal, 5 CARIBBEAN L. REV. 401, 404 (1995) (explaining that Jamaican
Court of Appeal also caused some delay by taking four years to give reason for dis-
missing one of defendants' petitions for special leave).
5. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 6 (stating that Pratt and Morgan contended that they
were held in sub-human conditions on death row). See also Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney
General ofJamaica, 43 W.I.R. 340, 343 (PC 1993) (reporting that Pratt and Morgan had
death warrants read to them on three different occasions, and that they were moved to
condemned cells adjacent to gallows all within span of fourteen years).
6. See CONST. OFJAMAICA sec. 17(1). Section 17(1) provides that "[n]o person shall
be subected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment."
Id.
7. See Reid, supra n.2, at 290 (stating that at apex of court system is Judicial Com-
mittee of Privy Council in England ("Privy Council")). See alSOJAMAICA INFORMATION
SER\'IE, JUSTICE, at http://www.jis.gov.jm/information/ustice.htn (stating that Privy
Council in London, England is final court of appeal for Jamaica).
8. See Pratt & Morgan, 43 W.I.R. at 360 (holding that unconscionable delay in im-
plementing death sentence constitutes infringement of section 17(1) ofJamaican Con-
stitution). But see De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 406 (reporting that Privy Council in-
cluded time taken to appeal to local Court of Appeals, and even Privy Council itself,
when determining whether delay was so great as to render carrying out of sentence
unconstitutional).
9. See Reid, supra n.2, at 295-96 (stating that Privy Council commuted petitioners'
sentences to life imprisonment). See also De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 405 (explaining
that Privy Council's decision overruled earlier decision of Jamaican Court of Appeals,
which held that carrying out a death sentence survives any delay that occurs between
sentence and execution).
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man or degrading punishment."' This ruling forced a wave of
commuted death sentences throughout the Caribbean.''
Although political independence amongst the Caribbean
occurred over forty years ago, Caribbean Nations still chose to
maintain their legal ties to the United Kingdom ("U.K.")
through their allegiance to the Privy Council. 2 As such, the
Privy Council is the highest appellate body for all Common-
wealth Caribbean jurisdictions (except Guyana).'" Yet, because
of decisions like Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney Gen. of Jamaica,'4 a
heated debate commenced regarding the replacement of this fi-
10. See Pratt & Moigan, 43 W.I.R. at 362 (setting forth five-year deadline for exectu-
tion to take place to avoid infringing on prisoner's constitutional rights). See at',o Reid,
sura n.2, at 295 (stating Privy Council's holding regarding five-year deadline for execu-
tion).
II. See De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 407 (reporting that fifty-three persons in Trini-
clad and Tobago had death sentences comuted because five-year time limit elapsed).
The inevitable result is that all other appellants apart from convicted murderers are
subject to a further delay in having their appeals determined. Id. See aLvo Roget V.
Bryan, Comment, Toward The Development of a Caribbeoin uisprudene: The CaueJor Estab-
lishig a Caribbean Court of Appeal, 7J. TRANSNAT'I L. & PotICY 181, 190 (1998) (stating
that Privy Council commuted two death sentences on grou~nds of unconscionable delay
in Barbados based on precedent set by Praft & Motgan).
12. See Helfer, sutpra n.3, at 1865 (stating that even though Caribbean States gained
political independence from United Kingdom (the "U.K.") beginning in 1960s, each
State did not sever legal ties to that country). In addition to the Privy Council, Carib-
bean countries, like Jamaica, also maintained other aspects of the English legal system,
such as: a monarchial system of government along with a formal written Constitution as
the supreme law of the land; the Queen of England as the Head of State, but not the
head of government; the Prime Minister as the head of the government presiding over
his Cabinet of ministers; and the Governor-General as the representative of the Queen.
Reid, supra n.2, at 290.
13. See Helfer, suna n.3, at 1865 (stating that in addition to local trial and appel-
late courts, each State retained Privy Council as its highest court of appeal). See also
ROSE-MARIE BELLE ANTI OINE, COMMONWEALTH'I CARIBIAN LAw AN) LEGAL SvsENMS 229
(1999) (stating that Republic of Guyana exercised its constitutional right to abolish
appeals to Privy Council).
14. See RAwuNS, sunna n.2, at 16-17 (describing facts of Guerra and Wallen v. State,
where Lincoln Guerra and Brian Wallen ambushed a young couple, James and Leslie
Girod, along with their seven-month-old son, Gregg, during a New Year's Day picnic in
Trinidad and Tobago). The two men bludgeoned and raped James' wife, decapitated
his son, and slit James' throat. Id. James managed to survive, however, and testify at
trial. Id. at 17. Guerra and Wallen were convicted of murder and sentenced to death
on May 18, 1989; their executions were scheduled lor March 25, 1994. Id.
The Privy Council investigated the matter on appeal with leave. Gueirra v. Baptiste
et al., [1996] A.C. 397, 399-40(0 (PC 1995) (reporting appeal made with leave of Court
of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago). The Court granted a stay of execution tip to April
25, 1994, for reasons of leave to appeal. De La Bastide, supra note 4, at 413 (stating that
Privy CotIncil granted stay of execution). Once this stay lapsed, the Attorney-General
stated that no execution was to take place Until after the Cot rt of Appeal determined
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nal appellate court with a more domestic Caribbean Court of
Justice (the "CCJ").'5
While many arguments both for and against the establish-
ment of the CCJ have been made," the concept of sovereignty,
or independence, has been brought to the forefront of this de-
bate. 17 This is known as the argument for "nationalism and soV-
petitioners' application for a stay. Id. On April 29, 1994, the Court of Appeal agreed to
these circumstances. Id.
Two days before the Court of Appeal could give its ruling, however, the Privy Coun-
cil held that if the Court of Appeal dismissed the petitioners' appeal and did not imme-
diately grant a conservatoxy order, the execution of the death sentence would be de-
ferred until after the Privy Council itself determined the appeal. Id. at 414. The ratio-
nale for this decision was that to permit the execution of petitioners before they had
exhausted their rights of appeal to the Privy Council, would constitute the gravest
breach of their constitutional rights, and would frustrate the Privy Council's exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction. /d. at 414-15. The Privy Council's actions have been inter-
pretedi as a lack of confidence in the Trinidadian Court of Appeal. Id. at 415. Ulti-
mately, this decision effectively deprived the local Court of Appeal of making a decision
on its own. RAWLINS, supra note 2, at 17 (stating that Privy Council issued conservatory
order before Court of Appeal was able to consider granting conservatory order on its
own decision).
15. See Reid, supra n.2, at 292-93 (stating that drive to abolish Privy Council seems
to have been motivated by Pratt & Morgan). See also RAWLINS, Supra n.2, at 6 (stating
that debate intensified after Pratt & Morgan). It is also noteworthy to mention that
even before the Privy Council delivered its controversial decisions, Caribbean Nations
were debating (albeit not as "heatedly") over the establishment of a Caribbean Court of
Justice (the "CCJ"). Id. at 10-14 (providing various newspaper articles, speeches, and
essays, spaning from first half of 1970s to 1988, arguing both for and against establish-
ment of CCJ).
16. See Ros,\LA HAMIII-ON, LEGAL & ECONOMic ARGUMENTS IN THrIEJuDc:I. COI-
MITrEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL V. CARIBBEAN COURT OFJUS rICE DEBATE (2000) (sumnma-
rizing various legal and economic arguments both for and against establishment of
CCJ). Other arguments include: the Caribbean jurisprudence argument (e.g., will CCJ
interpret laws using historical, cultural, social, and economic experiences of Caribbean
people, or are these considerations superfluous in legal system that adheres to binding
precedents?); the access to justice argument (e.g., will CCJ providejudges who are privy
to social experiences reflecting racial, educational, gender, and class profile of Carib-
bean, or is this concern already resolved by Privy Council's incorporation of Caribbean
Judges on bench?); the independence ofjudiciary argument (e.g., how fair and unbi-
ased will CCJ judges be?); and the institution of the court argument (e.g., can Carib-
bean governments afford expense of establishing CCJ?). Id. See also, RAWLINS, supra
n.2, at 23-65 (dividing CCJ debate into emotional and rational arguments); Bryan, supra
n. 11, at 200-11 (dividing CCJ debate into five categories: positive law vs. law as product
of society; legitimacy; nationalism and sovereignty; access to justice; and cost factor).
17. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 44 (stating that popular and justified argument for
establishment of CCJ is to view CCJ as symbol of effort to assert independence and
forge Caribbean unity). See also Reid, supra note 2, at 301 (stating that need for Ja-
maica, and other independent Commonwealth Caribbean Nations, to be truly indepen-
dent is one of strongest arguments for abolishment of appeals to Privy Council).
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ereignty."' Many have placed the sovereignty argument above
all other arguments in the CCJ debate because of its close rela-
tion to the controversy surrounding the death penalty.'
In contrast to the sovereignty argument, a more recent, and
yet marginalized, argument has emerged in the debate sur-
rounding the establishment of the CCJ with the attempt to estab-
lish the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (the "CSME")."'
Still in its preliminary stages, this entity is a response by Carib-
bean Nations to the challenges and opportunities presented by
the changes in the global economy.2 One of the principal shifts
18. See RAWLINS, sul-a n.2, at 44 (noting that "nationalism and sovereignty" factor
is argument cited in support of establishing CCJ); see generally DUKE POLLARD, TIIE CAR-
IBIEAN COURT OF JusrICE (CCJ): CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE 1-2 (1999), available at
http://www.caricom.org/expframes2.htm (discussing "sovereignty argument."). For
the purposes of this Note, this argument will be referred to as the "sovereignty argu-
ment."
19. See ANTOINE, supra n.13, at 244 (arguing that common denominator of new
move toward CCJ is to enable Caribbean governments and judges to hang prisoners on
death row). See also BERNICE V. LAKE, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OFJusTIcE: PUBLIC CONFI-
DENCE AND TIE ROLE OF THE MEDIA, Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Caribbean
Media Conference 7 (May 16, 2002), available at http://www.caricom.org/exp-
frames2.htm (asserting that opponents of CCJ contend that motivation for implementa-
tion of CCJ is power-driven by governments who have been stung by reversals before
Privy Council in death penalty cases).
20. See DUKE POLLARD, CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DOES
(2000), available at http://www.caricom.org/ccjq&a.htm [hereinafter 2 POLLARD] (stat-
ing that CCJ's importance to CARICOM Single Market and Economy (the "CSME") is
little understood and even less appreciated by many members of legal fraternity at pre-
sent time). See also MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & FOREIGN TRADE OF BARBADOS, CAR-
ICOM PROTOCOLS - AMENDING THE TREATY OF CHAGUARAMAS 1 (2000), available at
http://www.foreign.gov.bb [hereinafter CARICOM PROTOCOLS] (explaining that "Sin-
gle Market" part of CSME allows for movement of CARICOM goods, services, people,
and capital throughout Caribbean Community without tariffs/barriers or restrictions,
while "Single Economy" part yields coordination of foreign exchange and interest rate
policies, tax regimes, and laws and common currency).
21. See CARICOM Single Market and Economy, at http://www.caricom.org/archives/
2spcsmebackground.htin (stating that in 1989, CARICOM Heads of Government of
Caribbean Community (the "Heads") decided to work towards establishment of CSME
by way of Grand Anse Declaration in response to challenges and opportunities
presented by changes in global economy). See also MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
FOREIGN TRADE -JAMAICA, CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET (CARICOM)
SINGLE MARKET AND ECONOMY (2001), available at http://www.mfaft.gov.jm/
lntl_Community/Caricom.htm [hereinafter CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MAR-
KET] (commenting that Heads' decision was driven by need to deepen integration pro-
cess and strengthen Caribbean Community in all of its dimensions to respond to chal-
lenges and opportunities presented by changes in global economy). The kinds of
changes in the global economy include: the liberalization of trade and other economic
activities; globalization; and the emergence and expansion of regional economic blocs.
/d.
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in the global economy affecting small States, like those in the
Caribbean, is the trend towards globalization.22 For procedural
reasons, however, the CSME cannot be established without the
existence of a CCJ vested with original jurisdiction. 23 Thus, the
establishment of the CSME is another argument for the estab-
lishment of the CCJ.24
This Note focuses on the reasonableness of placing the sov-
ereignty argument at the forefront of the CCJ debate instead of
the CSME argument. The above quote from Jonathan Swift en-
capsulates this theme. The head represents a rational response
to an economic problem. Here, the argument for the establish-
ment of the CSME, the head, is the rational response to the eco-
nomic problem of globalization. The CSME, however, cannot
exist without the CCJ;25 thus, the CSME is the rational argument
for the establishment of the CCJ. On the other hand, the heart is
analogous to an emotional response. In comparison to the
CSME proposal, the sovereignty argument, the heart, is the
more emotionally charged argument for the establishment of
22. See Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community In-
cluding the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, pmbl. (not yet effected), available
at http://www.caricom.org/expframes2.htm [hereinafter The Revised Treaty]. The
Preamble recognizes that globalization and liberalization have important implications
for international competitiveness. Id. See also Owen Arthur, Small States in a Changing
World, 24 FALL FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 3, 10 (2000) (text from speech given by Owen
Arthur, Prime Minister of Barbados) (arguing that globalization confronts small States
in general with challenges, arising principally from its new international trade and fi-
nancial arrangements); Isabella D. Bunn, The Right To Development: Implication For Inter-
national Economic Law, 15 Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 1425, 1464 (2000) (stating that globaliza-
tion limits freedom of action governments have in setting own economic policies, and
diminishes predictability of economic conditions in general).
23. See DAVID A. Cox, THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE CARIBBEAN COUwR OF
JUSTICE AND ITS ROLE IN THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSME, at http://
www.caricom.org/archives/ccj-originaljurisdiction.htm (correlating CCJ's original juris-
diction with establishment of CSME). The relationship between these two entities is
based on the stability and predictability of the Caribbean economy. Id. See also P.K.
Menon, Third World Perspectives on International Law and Its Teaching, 6 CARIBBEAN L. REV.
198, 204 (1996) (explaining that economic activity cannot be effectively carried on
without standard of stability and systemic order).
24. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 43-44 (arguing that CSME presents compelling case
for establishment of CCJ). See also Hugh Salmon, The Caribbean Court ofJustice: A March
with Destiny, 2 FL. COASTAL LJ. 239, 239 (2000) (stating that new dimension of integra-
tion process goes over and beyond other arguments for establishment of CCJ).
25. See Cox, supra n.23 (arguing that connection of CCJ to CSME is fundamental
in that one cannot exist without other). See also Salmon, supra n.24, at 239 (arguing
that emergence of CSME will inevitably lead to a need for interpretation of rights and
obligations, which will be exercised by CCJ through original jurisdiction).
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the CCJ.2" For the moment, the heart has taken precedence
over the head in this CCJ debate.1
7
Part I of this Note discusses the background of both the CCJ
and the CSME. Part II analyzes the arguments of sovereignty
and the CSME for the establishment of the CCJ. Part III advo-
cates that it is indeed wise to argue rationally, in today's age of
globalization, rather than emotionally. While the CSME and sov-
ereignty arguments are closely related, and while the sovereignty
argument is important to the existence of Caribbean Nations,
the CSME argument should still be put at the forefront of the
CCJ debate.
PART I: FORMING THE HEAD AND THE HEART: THE
UNDERLYING LEGAL AND POLITICAL BODIES
The CCJ has been a concept in development for over three
decades."8 Almost twenty years after the notion of a CCJ entered
the minds of Caribbean governments, the CARICOM Heads of
Government of the Caribbean Community (the "Heads") 2'9 came
to an agreement to work towards the establishment of the
CSME.'" Although they are two different entities, the CCJ and
CSME are still closely intertwined."
26. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 43 (describing sovereignty argument as both emo-
tionally appealing, and rational). See also Salmon, supra n.24, at 231 (describing estab-
lishment of CCI as defining moment to take destiny into own hands).
27. See RAWLINS, sulpra n.2, at 43 (stating that sovereignty argument carries very
widespread appeal). See also 2 POLL\MR, supra n.20 (stating that importance of CSME to
establishment of CC] is unappreciated by legal community).
28. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 10 (discussing meeting held in 1970 by Heads of
Caribbean governments where question of creating final Caribbean appellate court was
addressed). See also Reid, supra n.2, at 292 (stating that since 1970, heads of govern-
ment in Caribbean community have been discussing establishment of CCJ).
29. See The History of CARICOM, at http://www.caricom.org/history.htm (stating
that Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago convened first Heads of Government Con-
ference in July 1963, in Trinidad and Tobago). Leaders from Barbados, British Guiana,
Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago gathered at this Conference to discuss the need for
close cooperation with Europe, Africa and Latin America. Id. See also CARICOM PRO-
-OCOLS, supra n.20, at I (stating that CARICOM itself was established through Treaty of
Chaguaramas (the "Treaty") and came into effect in 1973).
30. See CARICOM Single Market and Economy, sup/ra n.21 (stating that State Heads
decided to establish CSME in 1989). See also CARICOM PROTIOCOLS, supra n.20, at I
(stating that, in 1989, Heads decided to work towards establishing CSME by way of
Grand Anse Declaration).
31. See Cox, supra n.23 (arguing that CCI cannot exist without CSME and vice
versa). See also Salmon, supra n.24, 239 (explaining that CCJ's original jurisdiction will
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A. The Caribbean Court of Justice
The Privy Council was officially established by the Judicial
Committee Act 1833. :1 2 Despite their independence from British
colonial rule, all Caribbean jurisdictions today, except for
Guyana, show deference to the Privy Council as the highest ap-
pellate body."3 This appellate jurisdiction, however, is severely
restricted. 4 Nevertheless, the Privy Council's limited jurisdic-
tion did not keep Caribbean States from discussing the establish-
ment of the CCJ.35 One case, in particular, caused the debate to
heat up immensely, eventually leading to the formulation of an
Agreement for the CCJ.3
be utilized to interpret Treaty and Protocols that establish CSME and that such original
jurisdiction is absolutely essential to integrity of integration process).
32. See Judicial Committee Act 1833, ch. 44(l) (Eng.). Chapter 44(1) provides:
The President for the time being of His Majesty's Privy Council ... (words
repealed by Statute Law Revision (No.2) Act 1888, ch. 57) and such of the
members of His Majesty's Privy Council as shall from time to time hold any of
the offices following, that is to say, the office of lord keeper or first lord com-
missioner of the great seal of Great Britain ... (words repealed by Statute Law
Revision (No.2) Act 1888, ch. 57) and also all persons, members of His Maj-
esty's Privy Council, who shall have been President thereof ... (words re-
pealed by Statute Law Revision (No.2) Act 1888, ch. 57) or shall have held any
of the other offices herein before mentioned, shall form a committee of His
Majesty's said Privy Council, and shall be styled "The Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council": Provided nevertheless, that it shall be lawful for His Maj-
esty from time to time, as and when he shall think fit, by his sign manual, to
appoint any two other persons, being privy councillors, to be members of the
said Committee.
Id.
33. See Hefer, supra n.3, at 1865 (explaining that each Caribbean State retained
Privy Council as highest court of appeal). See also Reid, supra n.2, at 290 (describing
Privy Council as being at apex of Jamaica's court system).
34. See ANTOINE, supra n. 13, at 230 (stating that Privy Council's jurisdiction is se-
verely limited and only functions as Court of Appeal in very restricted sense). See, e.g.,
Re Dillet, 12 AC 459, 467 (1887) (establishing strict review for criminal proceedings).
35. See Salmon, supra n.24, at 233 (stating that despite conviction expressed by
governments since 1970, during initial urgings of Caribbean Bar Association and Gov-
ernment ofJamaica, debate on establishment of CCJ still continued). See also RIXWLINS,
supra n.2, at 10-14 (discussing various opinions, both for and against establishment of
ccj).
36. See De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 404 (acknowledging Pratt & Morgan as most
important and controversial recent Privy Council decision). See also Reid, supra n.2, at
302 (discussing Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of justice [hereinafter
AECCJ], and listing other instruments for establishing CCJ). The AECCJ is the main
instrument for establishing the CCI. Id.
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1. The Privy Council
The Privy Council was formally established by the Judicial
Committee Act in 1833.3 7 It was derived from the residuary juris-
diction, which the British Sovereign, as the fountain of justice,
possessed over all British subjects. 8 In its early years, the Privy
Council was directly responsible for a majority of the administra-
tive functions of the English government, and it conducted its
work using a system of committees."' Judicial disputes from the
overseas empire that were referred to the Sovereign were
handed down to the Judicial Committee."' In 1640, during the
English Civil War, the Judicial Committee was limited to the pur-
pose of hearing appeals from these overseas possessions.41 As
the British Empire expanded, and courts were set up in various
colonies, it became the norm to include in their Charters -
which gave the right of settlement - provisions establishing lo-
cal courts with a right of appeal to the Privy Council."
In 1833, judicial powers were effectively transferred from
the Privy Council to its judicial branch, i.e., the Judicial Commit-
37. See Judicial Committee Act 1833, supra n.32 (providing that certain members
of Privy Council will now form judicial Committee of the Privy Council). See also RAwt,
INS, supra n.2, at 9 (stating that judicial arm of Privy Council was only formally estab-
lished by Judicial Committee Act in 1833). The decisions of the judicial Committee of
the Privy Council were reported as early as 1829. Id.
38. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 9 (stating that Privy Council was derived from residu-
ary jurisdiction which British Sovereign possessed over all of Britain). See aLso Bryan,
supra n.I], at 183 (explaining that Privy Council was derived from residuary jurisdiction
which British Sovereign possessed over British subjects).
39. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 9 (stating that Privy Council conducted work through
system of Committees). One of these Committees was the Committee of Trade and
Foreign Plantations, which oversaw petitions from what became known as the "British
Empire." Id. See aLho HAMILTON, supra n.16 (noting that Privy Council is comprised of
several miscellaneous Committees dealing with scientific research, universities, granting
of charters, and other matters).
40. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 9 (explaining that petitions from British Empire were
directed to judicial Committee). See also Bryan, supra n.11, 183-84 (stating thatjudicial
disputes from overseas empire were first referred to Sovereign and then passed on to
Judicial Committee).
41. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 9 (explaining that Privy Council lost its function as
court in England during 1640 Civil War in England). See alho Bryan, supra n.l1, at 184
(maintaining that Civil War in 1640 confined Privy Council's judicial function to deter-
mining overseas petitions).
42. See RAW INS, supra n.2, at 9 (stating that local courts in colonies customarily
included right of appeal to Privy Council in Charters). See also Bryan, supra n. 1, at 184
(stating that it became common practice for local courts to appeal to Privy Council as
British Empire expanded).
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tee.4" The Judicial Committee has since maintained its status as
an independent court of law with a minimal connection to the
Privy Council, its parent administrative body.4 4 The 1833 Act, as
well as Acts passed in 1844 and 1871, provided for the composi-
tion of the Privy Council.4 5 Pursuant to these Acts, the Privy
Council is composed of select members of the higher judiciary
in England, as well as senior members of the judiciary of other
Commonwealth countries.46
2. The Post-Colonial Reluctance To Sever Legal Ties
Even though the Caribbean States gained their political in-
dependence from the U.K. beginning in the 1960s, they still
chose to maintain their legal ties with the Privy Council.4 7 Con-
sequently, all Commonwealth Caribbean jurisdictions today, ex-
cept Guyana, show deference to the Privy Council as their high-
43. See Bryan, supra n. 11, at 184 (stating that Judicial Committee Act 1833 effec-
tively transferred judicial powers from Privy Council to Judicial Committee). See also
RAWLINS, sup)ra n.2, at 9 (stating that 1833 legislation formally established Judicial Corn-
mittee as independent court of law).
44. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 9 (stating thatJudicial Committee consistently guards
and maintains its independent legal status and nominal connection with Privy Council).
Since the passing of the 1833 legislation, the Judicial Committee has resembled an
open court. Id. (noting that Privy Council's judgments were read in open court, and
did notadmitdissenting opinions until 1966). See also Bryan, supra n.l1, at 184 (stating
that since 1833 Act,Judicial Committee has operated as independent court of law, sepa-
rate from rest of Privy Council).
45. See Bryan, supra n. 11, at 184 (stating that Judicial Committee Acts of 1833,
1844, and 1871 delineated composition of Privy Council). See also RAWLINS, supra n.2, at
9 (stating that 1833 Act along with series of subsequent Acts provided for composition
of Privy Council).
46. See Bryan, supra n.l 1, at 184 (stating that based on Acts, Privy Council is to be
comprised of selected members of higher judiciary in England, as well as senior mem-
bers of judiciary of other Commonwealth countries). See also RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 20
n.10 (stating that members also include other persons who hold or have held high
judicial office, as well as retired Queen-appointed judges of superior Commonwealth
Courts). For instance, Sir Hugh Wooding, the late ChiefJustice of Trinidad and To-
bago, Sir William Douglas, former Chief Justice of Barbados, and Sir Vincent Floissac,
the Chief Justice of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Supreme Court have
all sat with the Privy Council and delivered judgments in Privy Council cases. Id. Usu-
ally, a panel for the hearing of matters in the Privy Council consists of five judges. Id.
47. See Helfer, supra n.3, at 1865 (stating that Caribbean States did not sever ties
with Privy Council upon gaining independence). See also Reid, supra n.2, at 290 (stating
that in addition to Privy Council, Caribbean countries, like Jamaica, also maintained a
monarchial system of government along with formal written Constitution as supreme
law of land; Queen of England as Head of State, but not head of government; Prime
Minister as head of government presiding over Cabinet of Ministers; and Governor-
General as representative of Queen).
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est appellate body.4" Accordingly, any decision the Privy Council
makes when hearing a case for a particular Caribbean country is
binding.49
Given this court's stronghold over Caribbean legal systems,
it is curious as to why the Caribbean States refused to sever legal
ties with the Privy Council in the first place. There were several
practical reasons that dissuaded the States from severance: in-
stances of Privy Council review were infrequent;"' over the years,
the court developed doctrines to limit the exercise of its appel-
late jurisdiction, particularly in criminal cases;' and filing ap-
peals in London was costly for litigants.52 These factors caused a
reduction in the number of cases heard on appeal by the Privy
Council from local Caribbean courts, thereby limiting its ability
to alter the Caribbean legal landscape.5 From a more political
48. See Heifer, supra n.3, at 1865 (stating that in addition to local trial and appel-
late courts, each Caribbean State retained Privy Council as highest court of appeal). See
aLso Reid, supra n.2, at 290 (describing court system for most States as having Privy
Council at top, Courts of Appeal next, and then High Courts last). There are a total of
seven Courts of Appeal throughout the Caribbean, and the High Courts all possess
unlimited jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters. Id. Other countries have a Mag-
istracy Court that is limited to civil and criminal jurisdiction. Id. See also ANTOINF, supra
n.13, at 229 (stating that Republic of Guyana exercised its constitutional right to sever
legal ties with Privy Council).
49. See Reid, supra n.2, at 291 (stating that Privy Council makes binding decisions
for any case in particular Caribbean country). Moreover, a ruling issued by the Privy
Council in one Commonwealth Caribbean country is persuasive over decisions on simi-
lar cases in other Commonwealth Caribbean countries, given that the Privy Council is
made tIp of the same physical members who will most likely come to the same decision
based on the same facts. Id. See also ANTOINE, supra n.13, at 106 (stating that decisions
of Privy Council originating from one Commonwealth Caribbean jurisdiction will Usu-
ally bind other jurisdictions). Yet, there is support for the view that a Court of Appeal
could reftise to follow these Privy Council precedents if the decision is felt to be wrong.
Id.
50. See Heifer, supra n.3, at 1866 (noting that instances of Privy Council review
were infrequent even when they were available in theory). See also Bryan, sup)ra n. 11, at
186-87 (analyzing number of cases going to Privy Council for ten year period of 1985-
1994, and finding that number of appeals to Privy Council was relatively low).
51. See Heifer, supra n.3, at 1866 (stating that Privy Council developed doctrines to
limit appellate jurisdiction, especially in criminal cases). See also ANTOINE, supra n.1., at
230 (stating that Privy Council's jurisdiction is severely limited).
52. See Heifer, supra n.3, at 1866 (stating that filing appeals in London was costly
for litigants). See aLso De La Bastide, supro n.4, at 401 (noting costly procedure of filing
with Privy Council, e.g., paying fees, at London rates, to English solicitors and counsel,
or paying to transport own attorney to England).
53. See Helfer, supra n.3, at 1866 (stating that number of cases that Privy Council
decided on appeal from local Caribbean courts was reduced because of practical fac-
tors, and limited its ability to alter Caribbean legal landscape). From 1985 to 1994,
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standpoint, reasons for not severing ties with the Privy Council
were: newly independent Caribbean governments were most
likely enticed by the cheaper Privy Council review paid for by the
U.K.;54 the Caribbean public believed that the court was incor-
ruptible and uninfluenced by local pressures;5 5 and Caribbean
legal elites supported the Privy Council based on the staff of able
common law judges.5"
3. The Current Caribbean Appellate Process
The Privy Council's appellate jurisdiction is severely lim-
ited. 7 As such, a State may appeal to the Privy Council in the
following ways: "as of right" from final judgments in civil dis-
putes, where the value of the dispute is more than a stated
there were 214 appeals from Commonwealth Caribbean courts to the Privy Council. Id.
at n.150. See also De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 402-03 (stating that within ten year period,
163 appeals were filed with Privy Council after a hearing, and sixty-eight of them were
dismissed without a hearing). During the same period, litigants filed 292 petitions for
special leave to appeal. Of these, the court granted only eighty-seven. Id. See also Privy
Council Office, Key Statistics, at http://www.privy-coincil.org.uk/output/page34.asp
(providing updated information on appeal and petition statistics).
54. See Helfer, supra n.3, at 1867 (stating that Privy Council review, which is paid
for by Britain, was cheap for Caribbean governments). This explains why Caribbean
governments, overseeing new Nations with many demands on the public fisc, supported
the Privy Council. Id. See also ANTOINE, supra n.13, at 238 (recognizing argument that
Privy Council costs nothing since it is supported by British taxpayers).
55. See Heifer, supra n.3, at 1867 (stating that Privy Council is perceived to be in-
corruptible and aloof from local pressures). This explains why the Caribbean public
supported the court. Id. See also ANTOINE, supra n.13, at 238 (recognizing argument
that Privy Council judges are men of judicial eminence, and are removed from and
uninfluenced by pressures of local, social, and political forces).
56. See Helfer, supra n.3, at 1867 (stating that Privy Council was believed to be
staffed by able common law judges). This explains why Caribbean legal elites sup-
ported it. Id. See also ANTrOINE, supra n.13, at 238 (stating argument that Privy Council
is far more likely to be continuously staffed with high quality judges).
57. See ANTOINE, supra n.]3, at 230 (stating that Privy Council's jurisdiction is se-
verely limited, and only functions as appellate court in a restricted sense). Under com-
mon law, an appeal must be specially conferred. Id. Early appeals to the Privy Council
were entertained as a matter of grace, but it later became the practice to include a right
of appeal to the Privy Council in colonial territories, with or without leave of the Colo-
nial Court. Id. This eventually evolved into the two methods of appeal to the Privy
Council that is still evident in Caribbean legal systems today, viz., "of right" and "special
leave." Id. These two methods, however, are further limited by the Privy Council itself
when hearing appeals of criminal cases. Id. at 232. It exercises its discretion to grant
leave sparingly and will not act as a Court of Criminal Appeal unless some serious injus-
tice can be shown. Id. See also Re Dillet, 12 AC at 467 (establishing that Privy Council
will not review criminal proceedings unless miscarriage of justice is brought about by
disregard of forms of legal process, or by some violation of principles of natural justice,
or otherwise).
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amount;5 8 by "special leave" of the Privy Council;' and at the
discretion of a local court in interlocutory matters or matters of
great public importance or constitutional matters.6" Given this
limited jurisdiction, it is apparent that the Privy Council does not
actually operate as a full appellate court.6 ' With respect to con-
stitutional issues, however, the jurisdiction of the Privy Council is
more generous, as there is no strict requirement for leave to ap-
peal.62
58. See PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, JURISDICTION OF JUDICIAL COMMI-ITEE (Mar. 2000),
available at http://www.privy-council.org.uk/output/Page32.asp [hereinafter PRIVY
COUNCIL OFFICE] (stating that appeals may be made by leave of local Court of Appeal as
of right from final judgments in civil disputes where value of dispute is more than cer-
tain amount). See, e.g., CONST. OFJAMAICA, sec. 110(1) (1962) (amended 1999). Sec-
tion 110 provides:
(I) An appeal shall lie from decisions of the Court of Appeal to Her Majesty
in Council as of right in the following cases -
(a) where the matter in dispute on the appeal to Her Majesty in Council is of
the value of one thousand dollars or upwards or where the appeal involves
directly or indirectly a claim to or question respecting property or a right of
the value of one thousand dollars or upwards, final decisions in any civil pro-
ceedings;
(b) final decisions in proceedings for dissolution or nullity of marriage;
(c) final decisions in any civil, criminal or other proceedings on questions as
to the interpretation of this Constitution; and
(d) such other cases as may be prescribed by Parliament.
Id.
59. See PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, sUpra n.58 (stating that appeal may be made by spe-
cial leave of Her Majesty in Council). See, e.g., CONSr. OF JAMAICA, sec. 110(3) (provid-
ing that nothing in section shall affect any right of Her Majesty to grant special leave to
appeal from decisions of Court of Appeal to Her Majesty in Council in any civil or
criminal matter).
60. See Reid, supra n.2, at 291 (stating that Constitutions of West Indian States
entrench right of appeal in certain specified matters - usually in cases involving consti-
tutional rights and freedoms). See aho PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, supra n.58 (stating that
some courts also have discretion to grant leave in interlocutory matters or matters of
great public importance or constitutional matters).
61. See ANTOINE, supra n. 13, at 234 (stating that Privy Council does not actually
operate as full appellate court). Under the limited boundaries of its jurisdiction, peti-
tions for leave may be dismissed, not because they have no substantive merit, but be-
cause they fall outside the narrow bounds of the jurisdiction. Id. See, e.g., De La Bas-
tide, supra n.4, at 402-03 (calculating that during the ten year span between 1985 and
1994, only 163 appeals were made and sixty-eight of them were dismissed without a
hearing).
62. See ANTOINE, supra n. 13, at 234 (stating that there is no strict requirement for
leave to appeal with respect to Constitutional issues). For example, an individual chal-
lenging the abrogation of his fundamental rights can appeal to the Privy Council pro-
vided that all local remedies to redress such rights have been exhausted. Id. See also
CONST. OF JAMAICA, sec. 110(1) (c) (providing that appeals can be made in any civil,
criminal, or other proceedings where interpretation of Constitution is in question).
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4. The Development of a Concept for the CCJ
The Sixth Meeting of the Heads, held in Kingston, Jamaica,
in 1970, marked the establishment of a Committee of Attorneys-
General to consider the question of creating a final appellate
Court in the Caribbean.6" These Attorneys-General drafted a Re-
port for the Organization of Commonwealth Caribbean Bar As-
sociations (the "OCCBA"), which this organization discussed
and studied during a meeting held in Guyana, on September 4,
1971.64 This debate fully erupted, however, when the Privy
Council handed down controversial and unpopular decisions
that directly affected Caribbean States."
5. Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney General of Jamaica
The Privy Council decision in the Jamaican case of Pratt &
Morgan,"" ranks as one of the most notable and controversial de-
cisions of the Privy Council."7 In this consolidated case, two
Jamaicans, Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan, were convicted of a mur-
63. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 10 (stating that Sixth Meeting of Heads urged estab-
lishment of Committee of Attorneys-General to consider implementation of CGJ). See
also The History of CARICOM, supra n.17 (noting that very first Heads of Government
Conference, held in July 1963, in Trinidad and Tobago, focused on establishment of
CARICOM); Communique Issued At The Conclusion Of The Second Conference Of Heads Of
Government Of Commonwealth Caribbean Countries, 13-17Januay 1964, Kingston, Jamaica, at
http://www.caricom.org/archives/communiques-hgc/2hgc-1964-communique.htm
(reporting that Second Heads Conference in Kingston, Jamaica, in January 1964, ad-
dressed air and sea communication issues, and other intra-State and international issues
of education and trade); Communiques Issued by Meetings of Commonwealth Caribbean/CAR-
ICOM Heads of Government, 1964, at http://www.caricom.org/archives/communiques-
hgc/index-communiques-hgc.htm (providing a list of reports detailing most of Heads'
past and current Conferences and Meetings).
64. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 10 (stating that Attorneys-General submitted Draft
Report to Organization of Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Association (the "OCCBA"),
and reviewed it during meeting on September 4, 1971). Various opinions, both for and
against the establishment of the CCJ, were developed after this meeting. Id. at 10-14
(discussing various newspaper articles, speeches, and essays, spanning from first half of
1970s to 1988, regarding establishment of CCJ and reflecting different sides of debate
over establishment of CCJ).
65. See id. at 15 (analyzing emotional reactions of people to Pratt & Morgan deci-
sion). See also De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 404-28 (examining various Privy Council
cases that fueled debate for establishing CCJ).
66. 43 W.I.R. 340 (PC 1993).
67. See Bryan, supra n.1 1, at 188 (stating that Pratt & Morgan was notable and con-
troversial recent decision of Privy Council). See also De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 404
(acknowledging that Pratt & Morgan was probably most important, and most controver-
sial, recent Privy Council decision).
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der committed in 1977, and sentenced to death in 1979. 68 Their
petitions to the Jamaican Court of Appeal were dismissed in De-
cember 1980, yet due to an oversight, the Court did not issue an
opinion with its reasons for the dismissal until four years later, in
1984.69 In 1986, the defendants' petition for a special leave to
appeal to the Privy Council was refused; yet, a year later, they
were issued a stay of execution pending a review of their case by
two human rights commissions: the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights ("IACHR") and the United Nations Human
Rights Committee ("UNHRC").7 1
For fourteen years, Pratt and Morgan had death warrants
read to them on at least three different occasions and were
moved to cells right beside the gallows.7 ' The Privy Council fi-
nally heard their appeal in 1993 and held that an unconsciona-
ble delay in carrying out a death sentence constitutes a contra-
vention of Section 17(1) of the Jamaican Constitution.7 2 The ap-
68. See Reid, supra n.2, at 293 (stating that Pratt & Morgan were convicted of mur-
der committed in 1977 and sentenced to death in 1979). Accord De La Bastide, supra
n.4, at 404 (stating that murder of which appellants were convicted was committed in
1977) with Helfer, supra n.3, at 1869 (stating that in January 1979, Earl Pratt and Ivan
Morgan were convicted of murder and sentenced to death).
69. See Reid, supra n.2, at 293 (stating that Court of Appeal did not issue reasons
for dismissing appeal until 1984). See also De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 404 (stating that
the Jamaican Court of Appeal had, due to oversight, failed to give reasons for its dismis-
sal of the appellants' appeal for nearly four years).
70. See Reid, supra n.2, at 293 (stating that in 1986, prisoners petitioned Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights ("IACHR") and United Nations Human
Rights Committee ("UNHRC") under International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights). Pratt first petitioned to the IACHR in June 1981, complaining about various
unspecified procedural errors during his capital trial and appeal. Heifer, supra n.3, at
1869. Subsequently, this claim was rejected by the IACHR in October 1984. Id. It did,
however, askJamaica to commute Pratt's death sentence on humanitarian grounds. Id.
In January 1986, both Pratt and Morgan petitioned the UNHRC, alleging a number of
violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), incltid-
ing a claim based on the death row phenomenon. Id. Seven months later, the UNHRC
issued an interim decision requesting thatJanaica stay the executions of Pratt and Mor-
gan pending a review of their allegations. Id. at 1870. See also De La Bastide, supra n.4,
at 404 (stating that basis for Privy Council's decision was four-year delay of Jamaican
Court of Appeal to give reasons for dismissal of appellants' appeal - omission was
claimed to be breach of ICCPR).
71. See Pratt & Morgan, 43 W.I.R. at 343 (reporting that Pratt and Morgan had
death warrants read to them on three different occasions, and were moved to con-
demned cells immediately adjacent to gallows all within span of fourteen years). See aLo
De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 404-05 (stating that death warrant was read to appellants on
no less than three occasions).
72. See Pratt & Morgan, 43 W.I.R. at 360 (holding that unconscionable delay in
implementing death sentence constitutes infringement of Section 17(1) of Jamaican
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plicable section provides for the prevention of tortuous,
inhuman, or degrading punishment. 7
The Privy Council based its decision on three factors that
punishment must satisfy to be deemed lawful: (1) it must be an
act done under the authority of law;7 4 (2) it must be an act in-
volving the infliction of punishment of a description authorized
by the law in question - here, it would be a description of pun-
ishment which was lawful in Jamaica immediately before the ap-
pointed day;75 and (3) it must not exceed in extent the descrip-
tion of punishment so authorized. 76  The Privy Council con-
cluded that the appellate system itself, and not the prisoner,
should be held responsible for the mistake of creating an appel-
late procedure that enables a prisoner to prolong appellate hear-
ings over a period of years.77
Pratt's and Morgan's sentences were commuted to life im-
prisonment. 71 In addition, the Privy Council established a
Constitution). Moreover, the Privy Council found the impact of the appellants' circum-
stances to be a sufficient account of the agony of mind that they must have suffered. Id.
at 343.
73. See CONST. OF JAMAICA, sec. 17(1). Section 17(1) provides that "[n]o person
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other treat-
ment." Id. See also CONST. 01JAMAICA, sec. 17(2). Section 17(2) provides:
Nothing contained in or done tinder the authority of any law shall be held to
be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the
law in question authorise the infliction of any description of punishment
which was lawfil in Jamaica immediately before the appointed day.
Id.
74. See Pratt & Morgan, 43 W.I.R. at 354 (holding that punishment must be within
authority of law). See also Reid, sup/ra n.2, at 294 (listing lawful act as first factor of
allowable punishment rationalized by Privy Council).
75. See Pratt & Morgan, 43 W.I.R. at 354 (holding that infliction of punishment
must be described as lawful tinder law in question). See also Reid, supra n.2, at 294
(listing second factor of Privy Council as authorized description of punishment under
law in question).
76. See Pratt & Moigan, 43 W.I.R. at 354 (holding that punishment must not ex-
ceed description authorized). See also Reid, supra n.2, at 294 (listing third factor of
Privy Council as punishment not exceeding authorized description).
77. See Pratt & Morgan, 43 W.I.R. at 359 (holding that if appellate procedures en-
able prisoners to prolong appellate hearings over period of years, then fault should be
attributed to appellate system that permits such delay and not prisoner who takes ad-
vantage of it). See De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 406 (reporting that Privy Council in-
cluded time taken to appeal to local Appellate Court and then to Privy Council when
determining whether delay was so great as to render carrying out of sentence unconsti-
tutional).
78. See Reid, supra n.2, at 295-96 (stating that Privy Council commuted Pratt &
Morgan's sentences to life imprisonment). See also De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 404
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twelve-month target to hear a capital appeal after conviction,
and then an additional twelve months for the determination of
the appeal to the Privy Council, thus completing the entire do-
mestic appeal process within two years.7 91 It also set a five-year
deadline between sentence and execution, and held that any
case in which execution takes place more than five years after
the sentence, warrants sufficient grounds for a finding of inhu-
man or degrading punishment."'
The effects of this ruling reverberated throughout the Car-
ibbean." In Trinidad and Tobago, fifty-three death row inmates
had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment because
more than five years had elapsed since their sentences were im-
posed." Such instances intensified the debate surrounding the
establishment of the CCJ and the abolishment of appeals to the
Privy Council."
6. The Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice
CARICOM has drafted several instruments for establishing
the CCJ; yet, the most significant of these instruments is the
(discussing Privy Council's decision to commute appellants' death sentences to life im-
prisonment).
79. See Pratt & Motgan, 43 W.I.R. at 361 (setting forth appellate process for domes-
tic appeals that would be complete within two years). See also De La Bastide, supra n.4,
at 407 (stating that Privy Council set targets of twelve months to hear capital appeals
after conviction, and additional twelve months for determination of further appeal to
Privy Council).
80. See Pratt & Morgan, 43 W.I.R. at 362 (setting forth five-year deadline fo execu-
tion to take place without infringing on prisoner's constitutional rights). See aLo Reid,
supra n.2, at 295 (stating Privy Council's holding regarding five-year time limit for exe-
cution); Bryan, supra n.l, at 189-90 (summarizing Privy Council's holding with respect
to execution deadline).
81. See De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 407 (stating that effect of Privy Council's rulings
was immediate and far-reaching). See also Bryan, supra n. 11, at 190 (stating that effects
of Pratt & Morgan were both immediate and far-reaching).
82. See De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 407 (reporting that fifty-three persons had
death sentences commuted because more than five years had elapsed). Other work of
Trinidad and Tobago's Court of Appeal has been largely put aside so that the Court can
concentrate almost exclusively on the hearing of appeals in capital cases. Id. The inevi-
table result is that all other appellants apart fiom convicted murderers are subject to a
further delay in having their appeals determined. Id. See also Bryan, supra n. 11, at 190
(stating that Privy Council commtited two death sentences on grounds of unconsciona-
ble delay in Barbados based on precedent set by Pratt & Morgan).
83. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 6 (stating that debate on establishment of CCJ inten-
sified after Pratt & Morgan decision). See also Reid, supra n.2, at 297 (arguing that Privy
Council's decision renewed open debate about abolishing appeals).
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Agreement Establishing The Caribbean Court of Justice (the
"AECCJ").84 According to the AECCJ, the CCJ shall consist of a
President and no more than nine other Judges, three of whom
must possess expertise in international law, including interna-
tional trade law. 5 All judges are to be appointed by a Regional
Judicial and Legal Services Commission, which will be composed
of the President of the CCJ, the Secretary-General of the Carib-
bean Community, persons nominated by the Bar Association
and the Dean of the Faculty of Law of some Caribbean universi-
ties, and members of the national States' government. 86
84. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 14-15 (stating that West Indian Commission, commis-
sion established under Grand Anse Declaration, created various proposals and reports
containing recommendations fbr establishment of CCJ). See also Reid, supra n.2, at 302
(stating that Agreement Establishing Caribbean Court of justice (the "AECCJ") is main
instrument for establishing CCJ); Establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and Econ-
ony Key Elements, 2 (2003), at http://www.caricom.org/expframes2.htm [hereinafter
Key Elenents] (reporting that AECCJ has been signed by twelve States thus far, ratified by
seven, and enacted into legislation by none).
85. See AECCJ, art. IV(]), available at http://www.caricom.org/expframes2.htm
(stating thatJudges of CCJ shall include President and not more than nine otherJudges
of whom at least three will possess expertise in international law including international
trade law).
86. See id. at art. V(I) (a)-(g). Article V(I) (a)-(g) provides:
There is hereby established a Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commis-
sion which shall consist of the following persons:
(a) the President who shall be the Chairman of the Commission;
(b) two persons nominated jointly by the Organisation of the Commonwealth
Caribbean Bar Association (OCCBA) and the Organisation of Eastern
Caribbean States (OECS) Bar Association;
(c) one chairman of the Judicial Services Commission of a Contracting Party
selected in rotation in the English alphabetical order for a period of three
years;
(d) the Chairman of a Public Service Commission of a Contracting Party se-
lected in rotation in the reverse English alphabetical order for a period of
three years;
(e) two persons from civil society nominated jointly by the Secretary-General
of the Community and the Director General of the OECS for a period of
three years following consultations with regional non-governmental orga-
nizations;
(f) two distinguished jurists nominated jointly by the Dean of the Faculty of
Law of the University of the West Indies, the Deans of the Faculties of Law
of any of the Contracting Parties and the Chairman of the Council of
Legal Education; and
(g) two persons nominated jointly by the Bar or Law Associations of the Con-
tracting Parties.
Id. See also id. at art. V(2). Article V(2) provides that if:
... any person or body required to nominate a candidate for appointment to
the Regional Judicial and Legal Services Commission in accordance with para-
graph 1, fails to make such nomination within thirty (30) days of a written
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To qualify as a judge, one must have at least five years judi-
cial experience, as well as good moral standing.17 These require-
ments help ensure a certain degree of independence of the judi-
ciary, so as to quash any fears of judges being subject to undue
political influence." The President of the CCJ is appointed by a
three-fourths majority vote of the States upon the recommenda-
tion of the Commission.' In order to further guarantee the in-
dependence and integrity of the judiciary, the time of office of
the judges is not limited (apart from an age limit of seventy-two
years) .9
request in that behalf, the nomination shall be made jointly by the heads of
the judiciaries of the Contracting Parties.
Id.
87. See id. at art. IV(10)- (11). Article IV(10)-( 11) provides:
10. A person shall not be qualified to be appointed to hold or to act in the
office of Judge of the Court, unless that person satisfies the criteria men-
tioned in paragraph II and -
(a) is or has been for a period or periods amounting inl the aggregate to not
less than five years, aJudge of a court of unlimited jurisdiction in civil and
criminal matters in the territory of a Contracting Party or in some part of
the Commonwealth, or in a State exercising civil law jurisprudence coin-
mon to Contracting Parties, Or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from
any such court and who, in the opinion of the Commission, has distin-
guished himself or herself in that office;
or
(b) is or has been engaged in the practice or teaching of law for a period or
periods amounting in the aggregate to not less than fifteen years in a
Member State of the Caribbean Community or in a Contracting Party or
in some part of the Commonwealth, or in a State exercising civil law juris-
prudence common to Contracting parties, and has distinguished himself
or herself in the legal profession.
1I. In making appointments to the office of Judge, regard shall be had to the
following criteria: high moral character, intellectual and analytical ability,
sound judgment, integrity, and understanding of people and society.
Id.
88. SeeJulia Lehmann, An Outside View ofthe Caribbean Court oJjustice, 2 CARIBBEAN
L. REv. 297, 306 (2000) (stating that method of appointment should ensure certain
degree of independence of judiciary, given that undue political influence is major con-
cern connected with establishment of CCJ). See also Reid, supra n.2, at 300-01 (discuss-
ing popular argument of Caribbean Judges being easily corrupted by politicians). But
see AECCJ, supra n.85, at art. IV(7) (providing that judges other than President shall be
appointed or removed by majority vote of all members of Commission, and not politi-
cians).
89. See AECCJ, supra n.85, at art. IV(6). Article IV(6) provides that "[t]he Presi-
dent shall be appointed or removed by the qualified mijority vote of three-quarters of
the Contracting Parties on the recommendation of the Commission." Id.
90. See Lehmann, supra n.88, at 306 (stating that unlimited time of office for
judges further guarantees independence and integrity of judiciary). See also Proposed
Code o] Judicial Conduct, ot http: //wvw.caricom.org/ccjconduct.htm (1998) (setting
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While the CCJ is meant to be an itinerant court, its seat and
Commission will be located in Trinidad and Tobago." The
judgments made by the Court will be final,92 and will constitute
binding precedents.93 These judgments will be enforced as if
they were judgments of national courts.94
B. The CARICOM Single Market and Economy
CARICOM was established on August 1, 1973.9  Sixteen
years later, the Heads agreed to work towards the establishment
of the CSME, by way of the Grand Anse Declaration."" The
CSME would amend the Treaty of Chaguaramas (the "Treaty")
through various Protocols, particularly Protocol I, which ad-
forth limits on any political, financial, business, or other dealings that would tend to
reflect adversely ol impartiality of CCI judges).
91. See Reid, supra n.2, at 303 (stating that Court's seat and Commission will be
located in Trinidad and Tobago despite its nomadic quality). See also ANTOINe, supra
n.13, at 247 (stating that seat of Court will be in Trinidad and Tobago, as determined
by qualified majority of Contracting Parties friom time to time). The Court will also
have authority to sit in the territory of any other Contracting Party, or even two divisions
where it is constituted of at least ten members. Id.
92. See AECCJ, supra n.85, at art. 111(2). Article 111(2) provides that "[t]he deci-
sions of the court shall be final." Id.
93. See id. at art. XXII. Article XXII provides that "U]udgments of the Court shall
be legally binding precedents for parties in proceedings before the Court." Id. But see
id. at art. XX(l). Article XX(1) provides:
An application for the revision of ajudgment of the Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of
some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the
judgment was given, unknown to the Court and to the party claiming revision:
provided always that such ignorance was not due to negligence on the part of
the applicant.
Id.
94. See id. at art. XXVI(a). Article XXVI(a) provides:
The Contracting Parties agree to take all the necessary steps including the
enactment of legislation to ensure that ... any judgment, decree, order or
sentence of the Court given in exercise of its jurisdiction shall be enforced by
all courts and authorities in any territory of the Contracting Parties as if it were
a judgment, decree, order or sentence of a superior court of that Contracting
Party.
Id.
95. See The History of CARdCOM, supra n.29 (stating that CARICOM was established
on August 1, 1973). See also CARICOM PROTOCOLS, supra n.20, at I (stating that CAR-
ICOM came into effect in 1973).
96. See CAtICOM Single Market and Economy, supra n.21 (reporting that in 1989,
during Tenth Conference in Grand Anse, Grenada, Heads agreed to work towards es-
tablishment of CSME). See also CARICOM PROTrOCOLS, supra n.20, at 1 (stating that in
1989, Heads decided to work towards establishment of CSME by way of Grand Anse
Declaration).
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dresses the restructuring of the organs and institutions of CAR-
ICOM.9 7 The CSME has yet to be established by the Member
States, but the year 2005 has been set as a deadline. 8
1. CARICOM
CARICOM was established on August 1, 1973, when Barba-
dos, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago signed the
Treaty.' The other CARICOM Member Statesjoined the organ-
ization subsequent to this date."' From its inception, CAR-
ICOM has promoted both the integration of State economies,
97. See CARICOM Single Market and Economy, supra n.21 (explaining that Protocols
are foundation of CSME). See also CARICOM PROTIOCOLS, supra n.20, at 2 (discussing
Protocol 1, as setting out restructuring plan for organs and institutions in CARICOM).
98. See Single Market On FasPt "rackJAMAl A GLEANER, July 2, 2001, available at http:/
/www.jamaica- gleaner. corn / gleaner/ 20010702 / business / businQssI .html (revealing
2005 as deadline o,- establishment of CSME). See also Caribbean Said to be on Track for
Single Market and Economy by 2005 deadline, CARIBBEAN MEDIA CORP. N.ws AGENCY, Oct.
31, 2002, available at 2002 WL 102328291 [hereinafter Caribbean Said to be on Track]
(reporting that Desiree Field-Ridley, head of newly established Single Market Unit in
Barbados, assured that 2005 would be deadline for CSME's establishment).
99. See The Histoty o] CARICOM, supra n.29 (stating that CARICOM was established
when Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago signed Treaty of
Chaguaramas (the "Treaty") on August 1, 1973). See also CARICOM PROTOCOLS, supra
n.20, at I (stating that CARICOM established through Treaty, and came into effect in
1973, after Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago signed it); Lehmann,
supra n.88, at 300 (stating that Treaty divided CARICOM into "Commnity" on one
hand and "Common Market" on other). The main concerns of the Community were
the coordination of foreign policies of the States, and functional cooperation among
States. Id. It was also to play a passive role in developing economic integration among
States through the establishment of the Common Market - yet, the role of actively
promoting this objective was attributed specifically to the Common Market as a separate
entity. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, art. 4(a) (July 4, 1973),
available at http://www.caricom.org/treaty.html. Article 4(a) provides that "the eco-
nomic integration of the Member States by the establishment of a common market
regime (hereinafter referred to as "the Common Market") in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Annex to this Treaty with the following aims . I..." i
100. See The History of CAICOM, supra n.29 (stating that other members joined
CARICOM subsequently). See also The Caribbean Community Member Countries and Associ-
ated Members, at http://www.caricom.org/members.htm (listing other current members
of CARICOM: Antigua & Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Gre-
nada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the
Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago). The Associate Members of CAR-
ICOM are: Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Is-
lands. Id. Countries considered to be CARICOM Observers are: Aruba, Bermuda, Co-
lumbia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, and Vene-
zuela. Id. See also The History of CARICOM, supra n.29 (stating that British Virgin
Islands, as well as Turks & Caicos Islands, became Associated Members of CARICOM in
July 1991).
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and the coordination of State foreign policies in the area of
functional cooperation. 101
2. The Grand Anse Declaration
In 1989, CARICOM's integration objective was further de-
veloped at the Heads' Tenth Conference in Grand Anse, Gre-
nada. 102 Consequently, by way of the Grand Anse Declaration,
the Heads agreed to work towards the establishment of the
CSME in response to the challenges and opportunities that the
changes in the global economy presented.1"" The "Single Mar-
ket" would allow for the movement of CARICOM goods, ser-
vices, people, and capital throughout the Caribbean Community
without tariffs/barriers or restrictions so as to provide for a sin-
gle large economic space and one economic and trade policy for
all States.' °4 During their Thirteenth Conference in 1992, the
Heads compiled the necessary technical work on, and conceptu-
alization of, the CSME for its endorsement."05 They agreed to
101. See The Hisitoy of CARICOM, supra n.29 (stating that CARICOM promoted
both integration of State economies and coordination of State foreign policies from its
inception). See also CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET, supra n.21 (stating
that overall objectives of CARICOM are economic integration, foreign policy coordina-
tion and functional cooperation).
102. See CA RICOM Single Market and Economy, supra n.21 (stating that at Tenth Con-
ference, Heads declared intention to deepen integration process). See generally Com-
muniques, supra n.63 (giving detailed account of previous and subsequent Heads' Con-
ferences and Meetings).
103. See CARICOM Single Market and Economy, supra n.21 (stating that Heads deter-
mined that Region would work towards establishment of CSME as one aspect of its
response to challenges and opportunities presented by changes in global economy). See
also CAR1COM PROroCOLS, supra n.20, at 1 (stating that in 1989, Heads decided to
work towards establishment of CSME by way of Grand Anse Declaration); CARIBBFAN
COMMUNITIY AND COMMON MARKET, supra n.21 (stating that decision was driven by need
to deepen integration process and strengthen Caribbean Community in all dimensions
to respond to challenges and opportunities presented by changes in global economy).
The kind of changes in the global economy included: the liberalization of trade and
other economic activities; globalization; and the emergence and expansion of regional
economic blocs. Id.
104. See CARICOM PROrOCOl.s, supra n.20, at I (stating that "Single Market" al-
lows CARICOM goods, services, people, and capital to move throughout Caribbean
Community without restrictions so as to achieve single large economic space and pro-
vide for one economic and trade policy for all States). Additionally, the "Single Econ-
omy" would allow for the coordination of, inter alia, foreign exchange and interest rate
policies, tax regimes, and laws and common currency. Id. This "Single Economy"
would also achieve a more level economic performance across the States. Id.
105. See CARICOM Single Market and Economy, supra n.21 (stating that during Thir-
teenth Conference in 1992, necessary technical work on CSME was completed and
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effect the CSME through nine Protocols to the Treaty, which will
provide the legal basis for its operation.10
6
3. Protocol I
Protocol I addresses the restructuring of the organs and in-
stitutions of CARICOM in order to enable it to function more
efficiently." 1 7 The Protocol collapses the Community and Com-
mon Market divisions of CARICOM into one entity called the
"Community.' "  Moreover, the Conference of Heads of Gov-
ernment (the "Conference") is designated the highest decision-
making organ of the Community; they will also be assisted by the
"Community Council of Ministers," which will act as the second
highest organ.")" This amendment also affects the issue of deci-
presented to Heads for endorsement). See also Communique Issued at the Conclusion of the
Thirteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 29
June-2 July, 1992, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, at http://www.caricoin.org/
archives/communiques-hgc/ I 3hgc- I 992-communiqie.htm (stating that Heads regis-
tered acceptance and endorsement of main elements that comprise CSME as well as
schedule for its implementation).
106. See CARICOM PROTOCOLS, supra n.20, at I (stating that nine Protocols
amending the Treaty provide legal basis for establishment and operation of CSME). See
CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET, supra n.21 (stating that all nine Protocols
will be consolidated into single text, which will become formal framework and constitu-
ent elements of CSME). The nine protocols are: I - Restructuring of the Organs and
Institutions of the Community; II - Right of Establishment, Provision of Services, and
Movement of Capital; Ill - Industrial Policy; IV - Trade Policy; V - Agricultural Policy;
VI - Transportation Policy; VII - Disadvantaged Countries, Regions, and Sectors; and
VIII - Competition Policy, Consumer Protection, and Dumping & Subsidies; and IX -
Dispute Settlement. Id.
107. See CARICOM PRoTocoLs, supra n.20, at 2 (stating that Protocol I deals with
restructuring organs and institutions of CARICOM to enable it to play role required of
it in single market and economy). See alo CARIII.EAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MAR-
KETr, supra. n.21 (stating that Protocol I addresses reconstruction of CARICOM organs
and institutions).
108. See Lehmann, supra n.88, at 301 (stating that Protocol I abolished division of
CARICOM into two institutions, so that Common Market alone formed integral part of
Community). See also Revised Treaty, supra n.22, at art. 2. Article 2 provides that "[t] he
Community is hereby established and recognised in the Protocol hereto as successor to
the Caribbean Community and Common Market." Id.
109. See CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET, supra n.21 (stating that
Conference is highest decision-making organ, assisted by Community Council of Minis-
ters). See also CARICOM PROTOCOLS, supra 11.20, at 2 (stating that Conference is high-
est organ and is assisted by second highest organ, Community Council of Ministers).
The other "lower-ranked" organs include: the Council for Finance and Planning (the
"COFAP"); the Council for Foreign and Commtnity Relations (the "COFCOR"); the
Council for Trade and Economic Development (the "COTED"); and the Council for
Human and Social Development (the "COHSOD"). Id.
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sion-making."
Protocol I modifies the unanimity rule for decision-making,
which impeded prompt decision-making by the States in the
past."' In view of forcing decisions upon States that voted
against the majority (i.e., the one-fourth minority States), the
Protocol also provides an "opt-out" possibility, where States can
withdraw from obligations arising from the decisions as long as
the withdrawal does not endanger the fundamental objectives of
the Community.11 2
4. CSME Establishment Update
The CSME has yet to be established, but CARICOM has set
the deadline for before the year 2005, when the Free Trade Area
of the Americas ("FTAA") is scheduled to come into being (as-
suming negotiations proceed as envisioned).'"' During an inau-
gural news conference, Desiree Field-Ridley, the head of the
newly established "Single Market Unit" of Barbados, noted that
despite serious economic challenges and a huge implementation
workload for member governments, the majority of Member
110. See Protocol Amending the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community
Signed at Chaguaramas on 4 July 1973, art. V, available at http://www.caricom.org/
protocl.html [hereinafter Protocol I] (providing for amendment of Articles 8 and 9 of
Treaty, and replacing them with Article 7(a), which covers functions and powers of
Conference). In particular, the amended Article 7(a)(4) provides that "[t]he Confer-
ence may take decisions for the purpose of establishing the financial arrangements nec-
essary to defray the expenses of the Community and shall be the final authority on
questions arising in relation to the financial affairs of the Community." Id.
111. See CARIBBFAN COMMUNNTY AND COMMON MARKET, supra n.21 (stating that
main feature of Protocol I is that it modifies unanimity rule, which impeded prompt
decision-making by Member States). See also l.ehmann, supra n.88, at 302 (stating that
while decisions in Conference would still require unanimous vote, Council of Ministers,
along with other Ministerial Councils, would only require "qualified majority" vote,
which is three-fourths majority vote).
112. See Lehmann, suipa n.88, at 302 (stating that rule provides for opt-out possi-
bility where Member State can withdraw from obligations arising from decisions). See
also The Revised Treaty, supra n.22, at art. 27(4). Article 27(4) provides that "subject to
the agreement of the Conference, a Member State may opt out of obligations arising
from the decisions of competent Organs provided that the fundamental objectives of
the Commtunity, as laid down in the Treaty, are not prejudiced thereby." Id.
113. See Single Market On Fast Track, supra n.98 (stating that deadline for establish-
ment of CSME is 2005, before Free Trade Area of Americas (the "FTAA") is effected).
Anthony Hylton, Jamaica's Foreign Trade Minister, emphasized that if the 2005 dead-
line passed without the integration of the regional economies, the region would have
massive competition from other areas attacking the single economies. Id. See also Carib-
bean Said to be on Track, supra n.98 (reporting 2005 as deadline for CSME's establish-
ment).
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States were still on course for meeting the target date.' '" While
Field-Ridley emphasized the signing of the Revised Treaty as a
major step towards the establishment of the CSME, it is not the
only step required of the States - States must also ratify the Re-
vised Treaty, as well as enact it into domestic law, and all of the
States have yet to satisfy these elements." 5
PART II: EXAMINING THE HEAD AND THE HEART
Legal experts have contended that many Caribbean States
view the CCJ as a symbol of their efforts to assert their indepen-
dence and unity, and believe that this opinion is the strongest
grounds for abolishing appeals to the Privy Council.'"' Experts
have also argued, however, that this sovereignty argument is
often confused with the controversial death penalty debate,
which, in turn, heightens the argument's popularity. ' 17 In con-
trast, other legal scholars have acknowledged that it is necessary
to establish the CCJ to battle globalization through the CSME. "8
114. See Caribbean said to be on Track, sulfa n.98 (reporting Field-Ridley's comments
about Member States being on course for meeting target date despite serious economic
challenges faced by some member governments and huge implementation workload).
Field-Ridley also stated that all except three States signed the Revised Treaty; the States
that have been "lagging behind" are the Bahamas, Haiti, and Montserrat. Id. Some
possible reasons for this delay were offered by Field-Ridley: the Bahamas does not par-
ticipate in the common market arrangements; Montserrat has to get British govern-
ment approval before acceding; and Haiti was only admitted as the 15th full member of
CARICOM in July 4, 1997. Id. See aLso Haiti, at http://www.caricom.org/archives/
countryprofiles/haitiprofile.htm (stating that Haiti accorded provincial membership of
CARICOM on July 4, 1997).
115. See Key Elements, supra n.84, at I (reporting that currently no States have per-
formed the required enactment of Revised Treaty). The ratification and accession of
the Revised Treaty have been fulfilled by only one State, St. Vincent & the Grenadines.
Id. In contrast, none of the States has enacted the Revised Treaty into their domestic
law. Id. See aLso, CARICOM Single Market and Economy, supra n.21 (stating that signature
and ratification of Protocols will provide Treaty-basis for CSME).
116. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 44 (discussing argument that views CCI as symbol of
efforts to assert independence and unity). See also Reid, supra n.2, at 301 (stating that
need for Jamaica and other independent Commonwealth Caribbean Nations to be truly
independent is one of strongest arguments for abolishment of appeals to Privy Coun-
cil).
117. See RAWINS, supra n.2, at 31-32 (discussing debate on institution of CCI as
being distorted by persons who convey impression that death penalty issue is impor-
tant). See aLso ANTOINE, supra n.13, at 244 (stating that common denominator of new
move toward CCJ is to enable Caribbean governments and judges to hang prisoners on
death row); Bryan, supra n.l, at 199 (stating that cases such as Guerra and Wallen
helped swing public sentiment in favor of death penalty over last decade).
118. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 43-44 (arguing that transformation of CARICOM
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A. The Heart: The Sovereignty Argument
Scholars have found that constructing a working definition
for sovereignty is no easy task." "9 Some scholars have identified
common usages of the term. 12" Four such uses are: "domestic
sovereignty,"' 2 ' "interdependence sovereignty," 122 "international
legal sovereignty,"'1 2" and "Westphalian sovereignty. 124 Many le-
into single market and economy presents, perhaps, most compelling case for present
need of CC). Further, the Court will perform a pivotal function in this endeavor, since
it will have original and exclusive jurisdiction in the adjudication of cases requiring the
interpretation or application of the Treaty of Chaguaramas and its Protocols. Id. See
also Salmon, supra n.24, at 239 (stating that new dimension of integration process goes
over and beyond other arguments for establishment of CCJ).
119. See Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, in IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 574 (HenryJ. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 2d
ed. 2000) (stating that sovereignty is not legal term with any fixed meaning). See also
Martti Koskenniemni, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Arguments,
in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra (stating that it is notoriously diffi-
cult to pin down meaning of sovereignty).
120. See Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra n. 119, at 575 (discussing four different ways that sovereignty
is commonly used: domestic, interdependence, international legal, and Westphalian).
See also Robert A. Madsen, The Struggle for Sovereignty Between China and Taiwan, in PROB-
LEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY 142 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001) (using tripartite definition of
sovereignty derived from Krasner's common usage of term); ATHENA DEBBIE EFRAIM,
SOVEREIGN (IN)EQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 52 (2000) (discussing ori-
gins and meaning of sovereignty and how concept has expanded throughout time).
121. See Krasner, supra n.120, at 575 (introducing domestic sovereignty as com-
mon use dealing with organization of authority within State and level of control enjoyed
by State). See also PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY, supra n.120, at 7 (stating that domestic
sovereignty involves both authority and control). The concepts of authority and control
addressed by domestic sovereignty also affect the behavior of actors in social and politi-
cal situations. Id. Authority is based on the mutual recognition that an actor has the
right to engage in a specific activity, including the right to command others, yet this
does not guarantee effective control. Id. Control, on the other hand, can be achieved
through use of force as well as mutual recognition. Id. See also Madsen, supra n.120, at
142 (stating that attribute of domestic sovereignty is effectively controlling events within
own borders).
122. See Krasner, supra n.120, at 575 (introducing interdependence sovereignty as
common use concerned with issues like State's ability to regulate flow of goods, per-
sons, pollutants, diseases, and ideas across territorial boundaries). See also PROBLEMATIC
SOVEREIGNTY, supra n.120, at 8 (stating that interdependence sovereignty is matter of
control and not authority); Madsen, supra n.120, at 142 (stating that international capi-
tal flows, information exchanges, and other forms of interdependence are controlled or
regulated so as to prevent them from threatening State's viability).
123. See Krasner, supra n.120, at 576 (introducing international legal sovereignty as
common use involved with status of political entity in international system - in other
words, whether State is recognized by other States). See also PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY,
supra n.120, at 9 (stating that basic rule for international legal sovereignty is that recog-
nition is extended to States with territory and formaljUridical autonomy). Historically,
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gal experts in the Caribbean have argued that the need for true
independence has been one of the strongest reasons for the
abolishment of appeals to the Privy Council.' This type of ar-
gument has also been noted for being emotional at times.' 6
The sovereignty argument for the CCJ focuses on Caribbean
States, as sovereign Nations, asserting their rights to determine
their own pattern of development - i.e., imposing an obligation
to chart one's own destiny. 127 Some scholars assert that to fulfill
rulers have also invoked other conditions for recognition like the ability to defend terri-
tory and maintain order. Id.
124. See Krasner, supra n. 120, at 576 (stating that Westphalian sovereignty is based
on two principles: territoriality and exclusion of external actors from domestic author-
ity structures). This sovereignty is violated when external actors influence or determine
domestic authority structures. Id. See also PROBLEMAI: SOVEREIGNTY, sU1n'a n.120, at II
(stating that other States, markets, transnational corporations, or international finan-
ciers may limit options available to particular government, but government is still able
to freely choose within constrained set); EFRAIM, supra n. 120, at 52 (stating that con-
cept of sovereignty emerged along with Nation-State in sixteenth century and was crys-
tallized in seventeenth century with writings of Grotius and Treaties of Westphalia).
The 1648 Treaties of Westphalia put an end to the thirty-year power struggle between
the State system, the Church, and the Holy Roman Emperor. Id. at 2 n.5. These trea-
ties formally legalized the birth of new sovereign secular States and have been charac-
terized as the first European Constitutional Charter. Id.
125. See Reid, supra n.2, at 301 (stating that need for Jamaica and the other inde-
pendent Commonwealth Caribbean Nations to be truly independent is one of strongest
arguments for abolishment of appeals to Privy Council). See also RAWLINS, supr-a n.2, at
44 (stating that viewing CCJ as symbol of independence and Caribbean unity is consid-
ered strongest ground by many for abolition of Privy Council).
126. See RAWLINS, supra n. 2, at 43 (describing sovereignty argument as both emo-
tionally appealing, and rational). See also Malanczuk, supra n. 119, at 574 (describing
sovereignty as wholly emotive term).
Addressing the need for the CC], Hugh Salmon, former Assistant Attorney General
forJamaica, made an emotional sovereignty argument. Salmon, supra n.24, at 234. He
states the following:
Why do we want this child to be born alive and vibrant? First of all, the quality
of our lives, the nature of our relationship and the content of our lives Must
embody and reflect and be psychologically rooted in our own Values and aspi-
rations as a nation and as Caribbean peoples.
Id. Salmon further comments that the "continued existence of a final Court of Appeal
located outside the region is an inhibiting factor to the development of an indigenous
jurisprudence which is more responsive to the values within our society and our aims
and aspirations as independent Caribbean Nations." Id. He then concludes that the
"Caribbean Court of Justice will serve to connect us to ourselves and fill that gap, which
must be filled, as the law continues its relentless search to be of continued relevance to
the society it serves." Id.
127. See HAMILTON, supra n.16 (stating that CCJ is important in asserting right as
sovereign Nation to determine own pattern of development). See also RAWLINS, supra
n.2, at 44 (stating that independence imposes obligation to chart own destiny); Bryan,
supra n. 11, at 206 (stating that independence imposes an obligation on sovereign Na-
20031 USING ONE'S HEAD TO SUSTAIN ONE'S HEART 1805
this obligation, the Caribbean people must create their own in-
stitutions. 121 Moreover, proponents argue that the process of ap-
pealing to the Privy Council is a remnant of the imperial past,
which maintains the old colonial relationship with the U.K. and
is inconsistent with the full attainment of political sovereignty
and independence. 129 Scholars also note that cases like Pratt and
Morgan demonstrate how the Privy Council can conflict with a
Caribbean State's right to self-determination."' Thus, they con-
clude, the argument of sovereignty holds fast to this notion of
identity, or self-worth, when addressing the establishment of a
Caribbean court of last resort. 3 '
Sovereignty arguments against the establishment of the CCJ
usually focus on the fact that Caribbean States actually made
tions to be architects of own destiny); De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 431 (asking, rhetori-
cally, whether it is not time to remove insidious and damaging belief from minds of
Caribbean people, and give Judges opportunity to fulfill more effectively obligation as-
sumed once oath of office taken).
128. See RAWIINS, surpa n.2, at 44 (stating that it is necessary to create own institu-
tions to chart own destiny). See also HAMILTON, supra n. 16 (noting importance of Carib-
bean Nations controlling own legal, social, economic, and political destiny); Bryan,
supra n.l, at 206 (noting that human aspirations and dignity are best achieved and
satisfied by development of institutions created and managed by native people them-
selves).
129. See HAMILTON, supra n.16 (arguing that appeals to Privy Council maintain old
colonial relationship with U.K.). See also Honourable Telford Georges, Address at the
Caribbean Rights Symposium (1998), in RWLINS, supra n.2, at 44 (stating that it is
compromise of sovereignty to leave final determination of legal disputes to court which
is part of former colonial hierarchy).
130. Reid, supra n.2, at 297 (noting that Pratt & Morgan demonstrates how Privy
Cotncil conflicts with Jamaica's right to self-determination). It also shows how the anti-
quated English common law influenced Jamaica through the Privy Council. Id. See also
De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 407-08 (stating that Pratt & Morgan raises issue of whether
these decisions should be made in London by judges who have no first hand contact
with societies to whom their decisions apply).
131. See RxwtANs, supra n.2, at 46 (stating that nationalism and sovereignty are
important factors CCJ debate). See also Lehmann, supra n.88, at 303 (noting that cut-
ting remaining tie, through establishment of CCJ, that links States to former colonial
period, will also boost regional self-confidence).
Another method for sovereign Nations achieving their own destiny is to show def-
erence to their own domestic courts, which coincides with the Caribbean jurisprudence
argument. Id. at 304. Rarely in Courts of Appeal throughout the Caribbean will lawyers
cite or quote an appellate case from another Caribbean country, unless that case was
decided before the Privy Council. Bryan, supra n. 11, at 206 (stating that Caribbean law-
yers commonly rely on cases from another Commonwealth jurisdiction such as New
Zealand rather than on more persuasive cases from Caribbean countries because of
stigma of inferiority that comes with cases decided by Caribbean jurists). Stich reliance
on the Privy Council creates a clear absence of precedents in the Caribbean. Id.
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conscious decisions to retain the Privy Council upon their inde-
pendence. 3 2 Opponents of the CCJ then continue to argue that
the States' choice was, therefore, an exercise of their sovereign
rights.' Additionally, some argue that a Caribbean State's Con-
stitution also counteracts the sovereignty argument for the estab-
lishment of the CCJ, given its reference to the Queen of England
as Head of State.1 4
Legal scholars, press, and politicians alike, have often
placed the sovereignty argument at the forefront of their con-
cerns mainly because of the controversy surrounding the death
penalty. " ' The Privy Council and the U.K. in general have
shown much distaste for Caribbean Nations' support of capital
punishment.136 On the other hand, nearly all Caribbean Na-
tions practice the death penalty, given that it has been retained
in their Constitutions. 37 Human rights groups have also spoken
132. See Helfer, supra n.3, at 1865 (stating that Caribbean States did not sever legal
ties to U.K. once political independence was gained). See also Georges, supra n.129, at
45 (stating that upon achieving independence, Caribbean countries had choice to ei-
ther allow appeals to Privy Council or abolish them).
133. See Georges, supra n.129, at 45 (stating opponents' argument that continuing
appeals to Privy Council would not be derogation from sovereignty because choice was
exercise of sovereign right to begin with). See also HAMILTON, supra n.16 (stating that
choice to retain Privy Council is no less sovereign than choice to retain ties to Interna-
tional Monetary Fund ("IMF")).
134. SeeJAMAICANS FORJUSTICE, GUIDE SHEET ON THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND THE PRO-
POSED CARIBBEAN COURT OF.JUSTICE, available at http://www.jamaicansforjustice.org/
guide.htm (2002) (arguing that sovereignty is not compromised by appealing to Privy
Council because, under present Jamaican Constitution, Queen of England is Head of
State). See also CONST. OFJAMAICA, sec. 68(1). Section 68(1) provides that the "execu-
tive authority of Jamaica is vested in Her Majesty." Id.
135. See ANTOINE, supra n.13, at 244 (stating that common denominator of new
move toward CCJ is to enable Caribbean governments and judges to hang prisoners on
death row). See also Leonard E. Birdsong, Is There A Rush to the Death Penalty in the
Caribbean: The Bahamas Says No, 13 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 285 (1999) (discussing
issue of death penalty in context of CCJ debate). But see RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 28
(discussing misconception of death penalty as reason for CCJ); Bryan, supra nIl 1, at 199
(stating that cases such as Guerra & Wallen helped swing public sentiment in favor of
death penalty over last decade).
136. See De La Bastide, supra n.4, at 408-09 (discussing Privy Council's distaste for
capital punishment as implied by language of Pratt & Morgan decision). See also Helfer,
supra n.3, at 1896-97 (discussing U.K.'s pressure on Caribbean Nations to abolish capi-
tal punishment).
137. See CONsT. OF JAMAICA, sec. 14(1). Section 14(1) provides that "[n]o person
shall intentionally be deprived of his life save in execution of the sentence of a court' in
respect of a criminal offence of which he has been convicted." Id. See also Heifer, supra
n.3, at 1897 (discussing Caribbean States' unified resistance in response to British and
European pressures).
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out against the Caribbean Nations' support of the death penalty,
and played a very active role in the Privy Council's Pratt & Mor-
gan decision. 138
B. The Head: The CARICOM Single Market
and Economy Argument
The CSME argument is centered on the notion of the CCJ's
original jurisdiction. 3 9 Recommendations for the conferment
of original jurisdiction upon what was to be the CCJ were made
as early as 1972. "" The purpose of the CCJ's original jurisdic-
tion is to maintain a stable and predictable economy, which al-
lows for the free flow of goods and services within the CSME. 4 '
This jurisdiction, however, is in no way unlimited, given that the
CCJ must adhere to the Revised Treaty in its decisions, as will be
codified once Protocol IX of the amendments to the Treaty is
effected.' 4 2 While the CSME is a response to the effects of
138. See Birdsong, supra n.135, at 286-88 (discussing debate between human rights
groups and government proponents in Caribbean Nations over death penalty). See also
Heifer, supra n.3, at 1869 (discussing involvement of IACHR and UNHRC in Pratt &
Morgan).
139. See Cox, supra n.23 (arguing that CCJ's original jurisdiction will play funda-
mental role in success of CSME). See aLso Lehmann, supra n.88, at 307 (stating that CCJ,
as viable dispute settlement mechanism, is indispensable for goals of CSME to be actual-
ized).
140. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 56 (stating that as early as 1972, Report of the Rep-
resentative Committee of OCCBA on the Establishment of a Caribbean Court of Appeal
In Substitution for The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, or what is called the
"Fraser Report," recommended conferment of original jurisdiction on CCJ). See also
Lehmann, supra n.88, at 305 n.32 (stating that suggestion for original jurisdiction was
first made at beginning of 1970s by OCCBA).
141. See Cox, supra n.23 (arguing that purpose of CCJ's original jurisdiction is
connected to stability and predictability within economy). See also Menon, supra n.23,
at 204 (asserting that without minimum standard of systematic order and reasonable
predictability, economic activity and political stability of any society will hardly be car-
,ried on effectively).
142. See ANTOINE, supra n.13, at 248 (stating that CCJ's original jurisdiction is se-
verely limited to interpretation of Revised Treaty). See also Protocol IX: Disputes Settle-
ment, art. XXVIII, available at http://www.caricom.org/protocolix.htm [hereinafter
Protocol IX]. Article XXVIII provides that "[t]he Court shall have compulsory and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes concerning the interpretation
.and application of the Treaty." Id. See also CARICOM PROTOCOLS, supra n.20, at 7
(listing disputes that can properly be heard by CCJ in accordance with Protocol IX as
including the following: inconsistency with objectives of Community within Member
State; injury or prejudice suffered by Member State, or lack in benefits expected from
CSME; illegal acts or organ or body of Community; and frustration or prejudice as
result of object or purpose of Treaty); Protocol IX, supra n.142, at art. XXVIII (limiting
CCJ's original jurisdiction to Revised Treaty).
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globalization, many commentators have argued over whether
these effects, as applied to countries in need of development, 4 '
are positive or negative. 4
4
1. The History of Original Jurisdiction
As early as 1972, recommendations were made for the con-
ferment of an original jurisdiction upon a Caribbean Court to
replace the Privy Council.' 45 In 1991, Sir Roy Marshall, the then
Vice-Chancellor of the University of the West Indies, advocated a
similar jurisdiction with respect to disputes which arise under
the Treaty. 4 " One year later, the West Indian Commission, a
body established under the Grand Anse Declaration and Work
Programme for the Advancement of the Integration Movement
of 1989' and mandated to formulate proposals to advance the
regional integration movement, afforded an unreserved en-
dorsement of the establishment of a Caribbean Court, primarily
on the ground that such a Court is essential for deepening the
143. See The Revised Treaty, supra n.20, at art. 4. Article 4 provides:
For the purpose of this Treaty the States specified in sub-paragraphs I (b), (c),
(g), (h), (in) and (n) of Article 3 shall he more developed countries and the
remainder listed in the said paragraph shall be less developed countries.
Id. See also id. at art. 3(1) (a), (d), (e), (f), (i), (j), (k), (1) (listing States as: Antigua and
Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Neavis, Saint Lucia, and
St. Vincient and Grenadines).
144. See IMF Staff, Globalization: Threat or Opportunity? (Apr. 12, 2000), at http://
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm (reporting positive effect of
globalization in Asian developing countries and negative effects in Africa). See aLSO JAN
AART SciHoLTrE, GLOBALIZATION: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTIION 6 (2000) (stating that global-
ization widened opportunity gaps between so-called First and Third worlds).
145. See RAWLINS, supira n.2, at 56 (stating that Fraser Report recommended con-
ferment of original jurisdiction on CCJ as early as 1972). See also Lehmann, supra n.88,
at 305 (stating that initially, CCJ was supposed to be Caribbean Supreme Court vested
with competencies for appellate jurisdiction only).
146. See RAWLINS, supra n.2, at 56 (stating that Mai-shall advocated conferment of
similar original jurisdiction with respect to disputes arising under Treaty). On that
date, while delivering the inaugural Anthony Bland Memorial Lecture at the Cave Hill
Campus of the University of the West Indies, Sir Roy suggested that a Caribbean final
court could perhaps be established as a Court in the future to function as an arbiter
with respect to the Treaty, a Human Rights Treaty, and the miscellany of cases which
are now appealable to the Privy Council. Id. at 12. See also Draft Enabling Bill to Imple-
ment the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice, para. 5 (1999) (sug-
gesting that CCJ have original jurisdiction).
147. See Grand Anse Declaration and Work Programme for the Advancement of
the Integration Movement (1989), availablk at http://www.caricom.org/archives/
grandanse.htm [hereinafter Grand Anse].
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regional integration process. 4 ' Finally, inJuly 1998, at the Nine-
teenth Meeting of the Heads' Conference in Castries, St. Lucia,
the Heads decided to invest the CCJ with original jurisdiction
that would allow it to adjudicate trade disputes and make deci-
sions with respect to the interpretation and application of the
Treaty and its Protocols. 4 9 Thus, the CCJ holds exclusive com-
petencies over disputes arising between two or more States and
those arising between the Community and a State. l"'
2. The Purpose of Original Jurisdiction
The purpose of the CCJ's original jurisdiction lies within the
148. See Communique Issued At The Conclusion Of The Tenth Meeting Of The Conference
Of Heads Of Government Of The Caribbean Community, 3-7July 1989, Grand Anse, Grenada,
at http://www.caricoin.org/archives/communiques-hgc/ l0hgc-1989-comunique.htm
(reporting acceptance of proposal for establishment of Commission of eminent West
Indians to promote purposes of Treaty with special emphasis on process of public con-
sultation and involvement of peoples of CARICOM through leaders, teachers, writers,
intellectuals, creative artists, businessmen, sportsmen, trade unionists, religious and
other community organizations). See aLso RAWLNS, supra n.2, at 56 (stating that West
Indian Commission endorsed establishment of CCJ on grounds that Court is essential
for deepening regional integration); AECCJ, supra n.85, pmbl. (stating that Contracting
Parties are aware that establishment of CCJ is further step towards deepening regional
integration process).
149. See LIxWlINS, sura n.2, at 57 (stating that in 1998, at Nineteenth Meeting of
Heads, decision was made to confer original jurisdiction on CC]). By virtue of this
jurisdiction, the Court will adjudicate trade disputes and make decisions with respect to
the interpretation and application of the Revised Treaty. Id. See also Communique Issued
At The Conclusion Of The Nineteenth Meeting Of The Conference Of Heads Of Government Of
The Caribbean Community, 30 June-4 July 1998, Castries, Saint Lucia, at http://
www.caricom.org/archives/communiques-hgc/19hgc-1998-communique.htm (report-
ing that Heads decided to invest CCJ, inter alia, with original jurisdiction in respect of
interpretation and application of Treaty).
150. See Lehmann, supra n.88, at 306 (stating that CCJ will hold exclusive compe-
tencies over disputes between two or more Member States, or between Community and
State). The Community or States can also request advisory opinions regarding the in-
terpretation and application of the Treaty. Id.
It is interesting to note that the Heads took approximately twenty-six years to de-
cide to invest the CC] with an original jurisdiction (from 1972-1998). RAWLINS, supra
n.2, at 56-57 (discussing Fraser Report's recommendation of conferring original juris-
diction on CCJ in 1972, and Nineteenth Meeting of Heads' Conference where final
decision to confer original jurisdiction on CCJ was made, in 1998). There is no set
reason for this delayed decision, but a possibility could lie in the ideological concept of
the CCJ itself, in that the nature, status, and jurisdiction of the anticipated CJ were to
be carbon copies of the Privy Council's in all respects, except for the nationality of its
judges. ANTIOINE, sura n.13, at 249. Yet, the Privy Council is strictly limited to cases
with specific appellate features and does not possess original jurisdiction; thus, a reluc-
tance to stray firom this ideological structure might have been at hand. Id. at 230.
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need for stability and predictability.' 5 ' Scholars note that for in-
vestors and individuals to be able to take advantage of the poten-
tial for economic advancement, it is necessary that a stable and
predictable environment be maintained." 2 Such stability is nec-
essary for reasonable assessments of the risks involved when mak-
ing confident decisions to engage resources. 5 '
Legal scholars note that in relation to the law, any rights
and privileges giving rise to opportunities for economic estab-
lishment will naturally flow from a regulatory framework estab-
lished according to legal principles and with the force of law.' 54
These scholars further reason that within this framework, clear
guidelines must be established along with prescribed sanctions
for breaches, to which investors and individuals may take refer-
ence to determine their rights and responsibilities. 55 Thus, le-
gal scholars conclude that where a dispute arises between States
- e.g., between a community national and a State - as to the
extent of their rights and responsibilities, the CCJ must interpret
the relevant provision of the Revised Treaty and determine what
151. See Cox, supra n.23 (arguing that purpose of CJ's original jurisdiction is
connected to stability and predictability within economy). Cf ANTOINE, supra n.13, at
230 (stating that Privy Council is now considered highest court of each individual inde-
pendent territory's judicial system; yet, before independence, Privy Council's finction
was to promote uniformity in common law throughout former British Empire) (empha-
sis added).
152. See Cox, supra n.23 (stating that stable and predictable environment is
needed for investors and individuals to take advantage of potential economic advance-
ment). See also Menon, supra n.23, at 204 (stating that economic activity and political
stability of any society can hardly be effectively carried on without minimum standard of
systematic order and reasonable predictability).
153. See Cox, supra n.23 (stating that stability will yield reasonable assessments of
investment risks). See DUKE POLLARD, THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTrICE IN REGIONAL
ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT, at http://www.caricom.org/archives/ccjregionalecondev-
dp.htm [hereinafter 3 POLLARD] (stating that stability in social and macro-economic
environment issuing from efficient justice sector lowers incidence of investment risks
and price of capital to borrowers and entrepreneurs).
154. See Cox, supra n.23 (stating that regulatory fiamework will generate rights
and privileges giving rise to opportunities for economic establishment according to le-
gal principles). See also 3 POLLARD, sup7ra n.153 (noting that law is basic and essential
catalyst for social and economic activity). In the modern State, nearly all regulated
social and economic activities are conducted within parameters established by law. Id.
155. See Cox, supra n.23 (stating that clear guidelines must be established so inves-
tors and individuals can refer to them when determining rights and responsibilities).
See also 3 POLLARD, supra n.153 (stating that efficient and effective justice sector instills
confidence in general populace and stimulates conditions of stability advantageous to
predicting consequences of critical decision-making, particularly in area of invest-
ments).
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rights and responsibilities apply to whom and in what circum-
stances." 6 The CSME argument for the establishment of the
CCJ therefore proposes that the CCJ be vested with the power to
interpret the provisions of the Revised Treaty and render the
intention and meaning of the provisions in a clear, consistent,
and uniform manner.1 57 Consequently, individuals and inves-
tors will be able to plan their activities by making the reasonable
assessments needed and with the necessary confidence to move
around within the single economic space.
1 58
3. The Limitations on Jurisdiction of the CCJ
The CCJ will have a severely limited original jurisdiction, as
it is restricted to the interpretation of the Revised Treaty, which,
in turn, lays down its sphere of operation pursuant to Protocol
IX. 159 Protocol IX of the amendments to the Treaty addresses
156. See Cox, supra n.23 (stating that when disputes arise between States, CCJ will
interpret relevant provision of Revised Treaty and determine rights and responsibili-
ties). See also Lehmann, supra n.88, at 307 (discussing high likelihood of disputes
among States in CSME, given that some States will be forced to accept decisions they
voted against because of new voting procedures set out in Revised Treaty).
157. See Cox, supra n.23 (stating that CCJ will be vested with power to interpret
Revised Treaty in clear, consistent, and uniform manner). See also 3 POLLARD, supra
n.153 (stating that status of CSME as association of sovereign States, coupled with re-
quirement for every State to enact Revised Treaty into local law, subjects Revised Treaty
to as many interpretations as there are national jurisdictions, thereby increasing
probability of legal uncertainty). Investing the CCI with compulsory and exclusive juris-
diction with respect to issues relating to the interpretation and application of the Re-
vised Treaty will help avoid this uncertainty. Id.
158. See Cox, supra n.23 (stating that with CCJ's power to interpret Revised Treaty,
individuals and investors will be able to plan activities according to reasonable assess-
ments and necessary confidence within CSME space). See also 3 POLLARD, supra n.153
(stating that social stability in national environment, coupled with plausible assurances
of protection for life and limb of individuals, impacts favorably on tourism industry,
which is largest generator of foreign exchange in economies of most Member States).
Moreover, lower transaction costs will impact positively on production costs resulting in
an enhanced competitive position for businesses. Id.
159. See ANTOINE, sulpra n.13, at 248 (discussing limitations of CCJ's original juris-
diction with regard to Revised Treaty). See, e.g., Protocol IX, supra n.142, at art. XXIX
(amending art. 12 of the Treaty). Article XXIX provides:
Subject to the Treaty, the Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
deliver judgment on:
(a) disputes between Member States parties to the Agreement;
(b) disputes between Member States parties to the Agreement and the Coin-
munity;
(c) referrals from national courts of Member States parties to the Agreement;
(d) applications by persons in accordance with Article XLI, concerning the
interpretation and application of the Treaty.
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the vital issue of dispute settlement. "" It originated from the
obligation undertaken by States under Article 33 of the Charter
of the United Nations"" (the "Charter") to settle disputes peace-
fully.'"2 It also adopted the six modes of dispute settlement set
out by the Charter: arbitration, adjudication, conciliation, con-
sultations, good offices, and mediation.'"l Furthermore, dis-
putes that can properly be heard in accordance with this Proto-
col must arise from the following: inconsistency with the objec-
tives of the Community of an actual or proposed measure of
another State;"" injury or prejudice suffered or likely to be suf-
fered by a State, or lack of fall-off in benefits expected from the
establishment and operation of the Single Market and Econ-
omy; "5 illegal acts of an organ or body of the Community;""
Id.
160. See CARICOM PROTOCOLS, supra n.20, at 7 (stating that Protocol IX deals with
dispute settlement issues). See aso CARIB1BEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET, supra
n.21 (commenting on Protocol Ix's focus on dispute settlement).
161. See U.N. CHARTER art. 33, paras. 1-2. Article 33(1)-(2) provide:
I. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek
a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, ju-
dicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties
to settle their dispute by such means.
Id.
162. See CARICOM PROTrOCOI S, supra n.20, at 7 (stating that Protocol IX
originated from Article 33 of Charter of United Nations (the "Charter")). See a1so CAR
IBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET, St15r/a. n.21 (stating that Article 33 of Charter
influenced development of Protocol IX).
163. See CARICOM PROTOCOLS, supra n.20, at 7 (stating that Protocol IX adopted
six modes of dispute settlement: arbitration, adjudication, conciliation, consultations,
good offices, and mediation). See also U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1. Article 33, para-
graph I provides:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solu-
tion by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial set-
tlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means
of their own choice.
Id.
164. See CARICOM PROTO:OLS, su/)ra n.20, at 7 (stating that dispute must arise
from inconsistency with objectives of Community of another Member State). See alo
Protocol IX, sulpra n. 142, at art. IV(a) (amending Article 2 of the Caribbean Common
Market Annex to the Treaty). Article IV(a) provides that Protocol IX will apply to the
settlement of disputes concerning "allegations that an actual or proposed measure of
another Member State is, or would be, inconsistent with the objectives of the Commu-
nity." Id.
165. See CARICOM PROTOCOLS, sulpra n.20, at 7 (stating that dispute must arise
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and frustration or prejudice as a result of an object or purpose of
the Treaty. 167
Article XXVIII of Protocol IX provides the CCJ with com-
pulsory and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes relating to the
Revised Treaty.16 Article XXIX elaborates upon the nature of
the actual disputes over which the Court will have jurisdiction.' 6 9
In essence, this Article illustrates the several means by which the
original jurisdiction of the CCJ will serve the purpose of promot-
ing stability and uniformity.17 1
from injury or prejudice suffered by Member State, or lack of fall-off in benefits ex-
pected from CSME). See also Protocol IX, supra n.142, at art. IV(b). Article IV(b) pro-
vides that disputes arising from "allegations of injury, serious prejudice suffered or
likely to be suffered, nullification or impairment of benefits expected from the estab-
lishment and operation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)" will be
properly heard under Protocol IX. Id.
166. See CARICOM PROTrOCdOLS, supra n.20, at 7 (stating that illegal acts of organ
or body of Community will warrant proper dispute hearing). See also Protocol IX, supra
n.142, at art. IV(c). Article IV(c) provides that disputes are properly heard where there
are "allegations that an organ or body of the Community has acted ultra vires." 1d.
167. See CARICOM PRTo-rocoLs, sulra n.20, at 7 (stating that dispute hearings can
arise firom frustration or prejudice under Treaty). See also Protocol IX, supra n.142, at
art. IV(d). Article IV(d) provides that disputes regarding "allegations that the purpose
or object of the Treaty is being frustrated or prejudiced" will be properly heard. Id.
168. See CARIBBEAN COMMUNIrv ANO COMMON MARKET, supra n.21 (stating that
compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction is set forth in Article XXVIII of Protocol IX). See
also Protocol IX, supra n. 142, at art. XXVIII (amending Article II of the Caribbean
Connon Market Annex). Article XXVIII provides that "[t]he Court shall have compul-
sorv and excltsivejurisdiction to hear and determine disputes concerning the interpre-
tation and application of the Treaty." Id.
169. See Protocol IX, supra n.142, at art. XXIX (amending Treaty by inserting an
additional article, Article 12). Article XXIX provides:
1. Subject to the Treaty, the Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and deliver judgment on:
a) disputes between Member States parties to the Agreement;
b) disputes between Member States parties to the Agreement and the Com-
mLnity;
c) referrals from national courts of Member States parties to the Agreement;
and
d) applications by persons in accordance with Article XLI concerning the in-
terpretation and application of the Treaty.
Id.
170. See Cox, supra n.23 (discussing how four categories of persons promote stabil-
ity and uniformity). See also AECCJ, supra n.85, at art. XII, para. I (a)-(d). Article XII,
para. I (a)-(d) provide:
Subject to the Treaty, the Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
deliver judgment on:
a) disputes between Contracting Parties to this Agreement;
b) disputes between any Contracting Parties to this Agreement and the Com-
niity;
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Article XXXII of Protocol IX deals with the notion of refer-
rals. 1 7 ' The functioning of this Article also compliments the no-
tion of uniformity, in that it basically confers upon National
State Courts the power to refer particular issues to the CCJ for
clarification or interpretation.17 2  The CCJ will submit its deci-
sion back to the national court, and that national court, in turn,
will apply the principles issuing from the CCJ to arrive at a final
decision.'77' As such, Caribbean legal experts have argued that
the notion of uniformity and stability, as set out in Protocol IX, is
at the very heart of the purpose for the CCJ's original jurisdic-
tion, thereby revealing a close relationship between the CCJ and
the CSME. 174
c) referrals from national courts or tribunals of Contracting Parties to this
Agreement; and
d) applications by nationals in accordance with Article XXIV concerning the
interpretation and application of the Treaty
Id.
171. See Cox, supra n.23 (discussing notion of referrals under Article XXXII -
formerly IX(c) - of Protocol IX). See also Protocol IX, supra n.142, at art. XXXII.
Article XXXII provides:
Where a national court or tribunal of a Member State is seised of an issue
whose resolution involves a question concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion of the Treaty, the court or tribunal concerned shall, if it considers that a
decision on the question is necessary to enable it to deliver judgment, refer
the question to the Court for determination before delivering judgment.
/d.
172. See Cox, supra n.23 (stating that Article XXXII compliments uniformity no-
tion because it gives States power to refer issues to CCJ for clarification). It is, in fact,
essential that those national courts and tribunals of Contracting Parties make use of this
power to refer matters to the CCJ, if the purpose of the Article is to be fulfilled. Id. See
also 2 POLLARD, supra n.20 (stating that when national courts are seized of an issue, they
must acceptjurisdiction and refer to CCJ for determination before delivering judgment
which ultimately must respect CCJ's finding).
173. See Cox, sulra n.23 (stating that CCJ submits its decision back to national
court, which, in turn, applies the ruling to arrive at a final decision). It is also possible
for the CCJ to issue a decision upon a referral that may have the effect of finally dispos-
ing of the matter in the national court, or helping to settle a discrete and distinct issue,
which is part of a number of other issues of which a national court is seized. Id. Thus,
Treaty provisions will be uniformly applied on an ongoing basis. Id. Ultimately, an
organic development of Treaty law within Member States will take place, extending
uniformly to other Member States where national courts are seized of similar issues. Id.
See also 2 POLLARD, supra n.20 (stating that Member States signing on to AECCJ agree to
enforce its decisions in respective jurisdictions like decisions of own superior courts).
174. See Cox, supra n.23 (stating that CCJ and CSME cannot exist without each
other). The challenge facing the framers of the AECCJ is constructing it so as to ade-
quately address the demands of a stable economic environment, which is absolutely
necessary for the success of the CSME. /d. The CCJ will play a decisive role in any
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4. Globalization
The International Monetary Fund (the "IMF") has de-
scribed globalization in reference to increased integration of
economies around the world, particularly through trade and fi-
nancial flows.175 Legal scholars include more contemporary de-
velopments in their descriptions.17 While much confusion sur-
rounds the construction of an airtight definition of globaliza-
tion,' 7 7 analysts often discuss the negative and positive effects
that the phenomenon has in countries in need of develop-
ment.'78
Many experts emphasize the negative effects of globaliza-
future success of the CSME. Id. See also Salmon, supra n.24, at 239 (stating that CCJ's
original jurisdiction is absolutely essential to integrity of integration process).
175. See IMF Staff, supra n.144 (stating that globalization refers to increasing inte-
gration of economies around the world, especially in trade and financial flow). See also
David Held, et al., Global Transformations, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT,
supra n.l19, at 1307 (stating that globalization reflects widespread perception that
world is rapidly being molded into shared social space by economic and technological
forces, and that developments in one region of world can have profound consequences
for life chances of individuals or communities on other side of globe).
176. See ROBERT K. SCHAEFFER, UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION: THE SOCIAL CON-
SEQUENCES OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 1 (2d ed. 2003) (stat-
ing that some analysts argue that globalization should also refer to contemporary devel-
opments, such as spread of environmental pollution, commercialization of culture and
languages, cross border migration of people, spread of drugs and narcotics, and emer-
gence of social and political protest movements opposed to globalization). See also
DAVID HELD & ANTHONY MCGREw, GLOBALIZATION/ANTI-GLOBALIZATION 3 (2002) (stat-
ing that "sceptic" analysis of globalization identifies current trends as reflecting process
of internationalization).
177. See SCHOLTE, surpa n.144, at 15 (stating that disputes and confusion about
globalization often begin around issue of definition). See also Philip C. Aka, The "Divi-
dend of Democracy": Analyzing U.S. Support for Nigerian Democratization, 22 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 225, 263 (2002) (stating that globalization is difficult to describe, partly
because the term is so loosely used and applied to so many different processes); Antony
Anghie, Time Present And Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions, And
The Third World, 32 N.Y.U.J. INT'i, L. & POL. 243, 243 (2000) (describing globalization as
complex and contradictory phenomenon).
178. See IMF Staff, supra n.144 (reporting on globalization's positive effect in Asian
developing countries and negative effects in Africa). Compare HELD & MCGREW, sura
n.176, at 85 (arguing, from sceptic point of view, that globalization causes dispropor-
tionate flow of benefits, from trade and foreign investment, to major capitalist econo-
mies, thereby widening gap between rich and poor States) and SCHoItOE, supra n.144, at
6 (stating that accelerated globalization has widened gaps in opportunities between so-
called First and Third worlds) with MOSES N. KIJGGUNDU, MANAGING GLOBALIZATION IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES ix (arguing that globalization offers
developing countries opportunity for economic, political, social, and cultural develop-
ment).
1816 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:1778
tion on less developed countries. 17' One negative effect entails
the crippling debts and other economic crises caused by global
finance."1 Scholars note that since the early 1980s, the debt cri-
sis surrounding global loans to developing countries has hin-
dered efforts to alleviate poverty in many countries. 8 ' By 1996,
forty-one of the world's poorest countries had, between them,
accumulated close to $250 billion in transborder debts. 8 2
179. See SCHOLTE, supra n.144, at 28 (discussing criticisms of globalization in light
of negative economic effects on security of poor countries). See also HELD & MCGREw,
supra n. 76, at 77-78 (reporting statistics of global inequality among developing coun-
tries as caused by neoliberal form of economic globalization); Dorith Grant-Wisdom,
Globalization, Structural Adjustment, and Democracy in Jamaica, in DEMOC:RACY AND HUMAN
RiGHrs IN THE CARIBBEAN 195 (Ivelaw L. Griffith & Betty N. Sedoc-Dahlberg eds., 1997)
(discussing negative effect of flow of information and information products through
ever-expanding technology in Jamaica).
180. .See SC: -OLTE, supra n. 144, at 28 (stating that global finance has produced crip-
pling debts and further economic crises in both large and small countries in Southern
and Eastern zones). Critics of globalization also claim that at the same time as this
crippling effect, global competition pressures have reduced aid flows to poor countries.
Id. See also HELD & MCGREW, supra n.176, at 78 (stating that economic globalization is
fundamental force in shaping patterns of global inequality and exclusion when consid-
ering location and distribution of productive power and wealth in world economy). In
terms of statistics, one expert noted that while the 900 million people residing in the
Western zone of affluence were responsible for 86% of world consumption expendi-
tures, 79% of world income, 58% of world energy consumption, 47% of all carbon
emission, and 74% of all telephone lines, the poorest 1.2 billion people in the world's
population had to share only 1.3% of world consumption, 4% of world energy con-
sumption, 5% of world fish and neat consumption, and 1.5% of all telephone lines. Id.
at 77-78.
181. See SCHOLTE, supra n. 144, at 215 (stating that debt crisis surrounding global
loans to developing countries has severely undermined poverty alleviation efforts since
early 1980s). As a result of this crisis, transborder debts of these countries grew sixteen-
fold between 1970 and 1997, to almost $2.2 trillion. Id. See also SCIAEFFER, supra n.176,
at 95 (stating that sudden inability of countries to repay debts created debt crisis that
threatened first and third world countries alike). Collectively, countries in Latin
America, Africa, and Eastern Europe owed $810 billion in 1983, which was a twelve-fold
increase from the $64 billion they owed in 1970. Id. See also Grant-Wisdom, supra
n.179, at 197 (explaining that acute debt crisis provided means by which International
Monetary Fund (the "IMF"), World Bank, and Interamerican Development Bank (the
"IADB") played fundamental role in scope and direction of policy in Jamaica).
182. See SCiHOLTE, supra n.144, at 216 (stating that forty-one of world's poorest
countries accumulated some $250 billion in transborder debts during 1996). See also
Keith Griffin & A.R. Kahn, Globalization and the Developing World, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RicHiis IN CONTEXT, supra n. 119, at 1328-29 (stating argument that concessional
loans and grants issued to developing countries from Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (the "OECD"), and other rich countries, benefit donors
more than they help recipients). One scholar notes that too much foreign aid serves
no developmental purpose, but is instead used to promote exports of the donor coun-
try, to encourage the use of (imported) capital-intensive methods of production, or to
strengthen the police and armed forces of the recipient country. Id.
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Proponents of globalization emphasize the efficiency and
economic growth that result from global trade in a single open
marketplace.' In contrast to the debt crisis, scholars have
noted that several initiatives in the 1990s managed to reduce
some of the transborder debts in developing countries.1 "4 For
example, in the mid-1990s, the IMF and the World Bank jointly
formulated the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (the
"HIPC") for relief on debt owed to multilateral institutions."5
Another popular program in the 1990s was the debt-equity swaps
program, which aimed at reducing debt loads of developing
countries.1 8 6
Experts also discuss globalization's effect on a developing
Nation's sovereignty. 8 7 Some scholars contend that contempo-
183. See SCHOLTE, supra n.144, at 27 (stating that enthusiasts emphasize gains in
efficiency and economic growth that result once world becomes single open market-
place). Proponents also argue that global trade enhances consumer satisfaction be-
cause it results in more distribution to a greater number of people at a lower price. Id.
See also SCHAEFFER, supra n.176, at 6 (quoting United Nations as stating that globaliza-
tion opens many opportunities for millions of people around world); Director General
Mike Moore, Trade, Poverty and the Human Face of Globalization, Address at the
London School of Economics (June 16, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/ news e/spmme/spmm32_e.htm (stating that inefficiency is never good, and
that maximizing efficiency means enabling people to fulfill their potential and helping
countries make most of their resources and conserve their environment)
184. .See ScioirEi, supra n. 144, at 216 (stating that initiatives, taking place in
1990s, brought some reduction of debts). See generally KIC.GUNDU, sat/ra n.178, at 245
(stating that debt crisis has always been associated with active searches for different
resolutions).
185. See SCHOLTE, supra n.144, at 216 (stating that Highly Indebted Poor Countries
Initiative (the "HIPC") was jointly formed by IMF and World Bank in mid-1990s). The
HIPC program was enhanced in 1999 by supplying indebted countries with larger
funds, less stringent eligibility criteria, and faster delivery of relief. Id. But see SCHAEI-
FER, supra n.176, at 109 (stating that indebted countries managed to repay debts but
found themselves deeper in debt). Between 1982 and 1990, lenders sent $927 billion to
borrowers, and within that same period, these borrowers repaid lenders $1,345 billion
in principal and interest. Id. Indebted countries, therefore, paid $418 billion mnore
than they received. Id.
186. See Kca ;UNDU, supra n.178, at 245-50 (discussing the debt-equity swap pro-
gram and how it planned on reducing debt loads). This program was introduced
through the 1989 "Brady Plan." Id. Debt-equity swaps is a process by which a debt
instrument of a debtor country, denominated in foreign exchange, is converted into an
equity investment in that country. Id. Thus, tunder this program, an indebted country's
loan could be converted into equity shares of a company in that country. Id. See also
SCHOLTE, supra n. 144, at 216 (stating that fifteen governments between 1989 and 1996
engaged in "Brady deals" where some of their bank debt was converted into bonds at
lower interest rates).
187. See Grant-Wisdom, sulira n.179, at 194-95 (discussing globalization and Na-
tion-State sovereignty). See also Sc:nOLTE, .supra n. 144, at 308-09 (addressing sovereignty
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rary globalization makes a State's sovereign governance impracti-
cable. 8 As such, they argue that developing countries have al-
lowed large industrialized countries and international financial
institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, the Inter-American
Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, to dictate
economic policies to them.' 8t They further argue that State poli-
ticians, civil servants, and armed forces around the world have
vested interests in sustaining the notion that full and final au-
thority lies with their own national governments."' ° Experts also
note that the effectiveness of sovereignty is largely dependent on
a State's command over economic power and resources.'
PART III: HEADS UP AND DOWNHEARTED
Both the sovereignty and CSME arguments make strong
as major challenge to implementation of ambitious reformism); HELD & MCGREW,
supra n.176, at 23-24 (discussing challenges of States' sovereignty and legitimacy in con-
test global and regional interconnectedness, along with supranational, intergovernmen-
tal, and transnational forces).
188. See SCHOLTE, surpa n.144, at 308 (stating that globalization made State sover-
eignty impracticable). See also Bunn, supra n.22, at 1464 (stating that globalization
places limits on freedom of action State governments have in setting own economic
policies, and diminishes predictability of economic conditions in general). In 1998, the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights held a general session on global-
ization and its impact on economic and social rights. Id. The Committee concluded
that the process of globalization risks downgrading the central place accorded to
human rights by the U.N., unless it is complemented by additional policies. Id. Spe-
cific rights at risk include the right to work, the right to just and favorable working
conditions, the right to unionize, and the right to have social security. Id.
189. See Frank B. Rampersad, Coping with Globalization: A Suggested Policy Package for
Small Countries, 570 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 115, 116 (2000) (stating that
developing countries have allowed their economic policies to be dictated to them by
industrialized countries and international financial community). See also Anghie, supra
n. 177, at 244 (arguing that globalization, by way of international finance institutions,
may have adverse consequences for vast majority of third world countries).
190. See Sci-olTrE, supra n. 144, at 308 (stating that millions of politicians, civil ser-
vants, and armed forces working within centralized State apparatuses, have vested inter-
est in maintaining notion that full and final authority lies with national government).
See also H:LD & McGREW, supra n. 177, at 126 (stating that many States still retain ulti-
mate legal claim to effective supremacy over what occurs within own territories).
191. See Grant-Wisdom, surpa n.176, at 193 (stating that effective power bestowed
by sovereignty is largely dependent on economic power and resources that State can
command). This relationship arises from the historical link between the exercise of
sovereignty and the accumulation and expansion of capital, as well as the concomitant
structure of power relations. Id. See aLso HELD & MC(GRFW, supra n. 177, at 46 (stating
that while most States rely on international flows of trade and finance to ensure na-
tional economic growth, limits to and constraints on national economic autonomy and
sovereignty become more visible).
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cases for the establishment of the CCJ.' 9 2 Sovereignty, while a
difficult term to define, 9 speaks to a Caribbean State's right to
independence. 94 In contrast, the CSME argument focuses on
developing a more predictable and stable economy, where peo-
ple are able to make reasonable and confident assessments of
investment risks.' 95 The question, then, is why should the sover-
eignty argument be put ahead of the CSME argument in the CCJ
debate?' 96 Both of these concepts, sovereignty and economy,
seem to be equally valuable to a State's well-being; however, this
is only if one believes these concepts to be valuable in and of
themselves. An analysis of the underlying values of these con-
cepts will reveal two main points: first, the two arguments even-
tually overlap with one another, and second, the CSME argu-
ment should not be marginalized in the CCJ debate.
Caribbean sovereignty identifies with two of the common
usages of sovereignty.' 97 The first usage is domestic sover-
eignty.'98 Advocates of the CCJ argue that Caribbean States
need to create their own institutions and chart their own
destiny 99 - in other words, they wish to organize and control
their own legal authority.20° The second usage is Westphalian
sovereignty.2 1 Arguments for the establishment of the CCJ per-
taining to the Privy Council's effect on domestic Caribbean
courts fall within this category of sovereignty.t) 2 Placing the sov-
192. See supra, nn.119-91 and accompanying text (discussing sovereignty and
CSME arguments).
193. See supra n. 119 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of defining sover-
eignty).
194. See supra n.116 and accompanying text (discussing sovereignty in context of
independence).
195. See supra nn.152-53 and accompanying text (discussing need for stable econ-
omy that will lead to reasonable assessments of investment risks).
196. See supra nn.17, 20 and accompanying text (discussing popularity of sover-
eignty argument and marginalization of CSME argument).
197. See supra nn.120-24 and accompanying text (discussing common usages of
sovereignty).
198. See supra n.121 and accompanying text (discussing domestic sovereignty us-
age).
199. See supra nn.127-28, and accompanying text (discussing Caribbean States'
need to chart own destiny and create own institutions).
200. See supra n.121 and accompanying text (describing domestic sovereignty as
dealing with States' organization and control of authority).
201. See supra n.124 and accompanying text (discussing Westphalian sovereignty).
202. See supra nn.126, 130 and accompanying text (discussing Salmon's argument
against Court of Appeal located outside Caribbean region, and Privy Council's effect on
Caribbean through Pratt & Morgan decision respectively).
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ereignty argument within these categories, however, does not an-
swer the question of what makes the concept of sovereignty itself
so valuable.
According to Caribbean legal experts, sovereignty is what
brings a sense of pride, self-confidence, and self-worth to the
people.2 111 It is cutting the remaining string of an oppressive past
and building a future based on one's own domestic values and
culture.2 4  To these experts, sovereignty means more than
merely fighting for the right to exercise the death penalty when-
ever it seems fit.2111 Sovereignty is what will make Caribbean
States whole - it is a gap-filler.2 1
The CSME argument advocates a stable and predictable
economy through the CCJ's original jurisdiction. 21'7 Laws, or a
legal institution, regulating a stable and predictable economy
will, in turn, create more economic activity among Caribbean
States208 as well as foreign investors.2119 While building a stronger
economy is valuable to a State, it is not the underlying reason for
the CSME argument. The underlying value for forming a
stronger economy among Caribbean States, is survival and the
advantage gained from globalization.
As some commentators have argued, the phenomenon of
globalization can be a very deadly movement towards a virtual
extinction of developing countries through debt crises.2 0 In
contrast, others argue that globalization encourages economic
growth through global trade.2 1' Whatever effect globalization
203. See supra n.131 and accompanying text (discussing sovereignty in context of
self-worth and self-confidence).
204. See id. and accompanying text (discussing severing remaining tie to colonial
past, and need for dependence on own domestic courts to develop own jurisprudence).
See also supra n.129 and accompanying text (discussing argument that Privy Council is
remnant of imperial past).
205. See supra nn.135-38 and accompanying text (discussing argument that sover-
eignty centers around States' right to exercise death penalty).
206. See supra n. 126 and accompanying text (discussing Salmon's view that CC] will
serve to fill gap that must be filled and connect people to themselves).
207. See supra nn.151-58 and accompanying text (discussing CSME in context of
stable and predictable economy provided by CCJ).
208. See supra nn.154-55 and accompanying text (discussing CCJ's ability, through
original jurisdiction, to encourage economic activity).
209. See supra n. 158 and accompanying text (discussing how law will bring social
stability which impacts favorably on tourism industry).
210. See supra nn. 180-82 and accompanying text (discussing negative impact of
debt crises, produced by globalization, on less developed countries).
211. See supra n.183 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of globalization).
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has on Caribbean States, the CSME is meant to both neutralize
the crippling effect of debt crises, and take advantage of the
many opportunities emerging from global trade.2 1 2 And as the
argument goes, none of this will take effect without the establish-
ment of the CCJ. The CCJ will provide the stable and predict-
able economy necessary for investors to take advantage of oppor-
tunities produced by globalization.21 3 Thus, there is a bicondi-
tional relationship between the CSME and the CCJ:2 14 without
the CCJ, the CSME will not be an effective tool to tackle global-
ization, and without the CSME, the CCJ will be a superfluous
institution, given that States will be burdened with debt crises, an
unpredictable market in which no one will care to invest, and
missed opportunities in the global market.
While the underlying values of these two arguments have
been discussed, the questions still remain as to how the sover-
eignty and CSME arguments eventually overlap, and why the
CSME argument should be placed at the forefront of the CCJ
debate. First, the CSME can itself be categorized as a type of
sovereignty. Interdependence sovereignty is concerned with a
State's ability to regulate flow of persons, goods, pollutants, dis-
eases, and ideas across territorial boundaries. 21 5 The CSME is
also concerned with the free flow of CARICOM people, goods,
services, and capital throughout Caribbean States, without tar-
iffs/barriers or restrictions.2" 6 It basically looks to gain control
of its own economy. Thus, the CSME is not only a response to
globalization, but it is also an advocate for sovereignty. Addition-
ally, international sovereignty, another common usage of the
term, is also present in the CSME argument, given the CSME's
encouragement of foreign investment through tourism.2 1 7
The CSME's relation to the sovereignty argument raises the
212. See supra n.103 and accompanying text (discussing CSME as response to chal-
lenges and opportunities of globalization).
213. See supra n.152 and accompanying text (discussing need for predictable envi-
ronment to take advantage of economic advancement).
214. See supra nn.25, 174 and accompanying text (discussing biconditional rela-
tionship between CCJ and CSME).
215. See supra n.122 and accompanying text (discussing interdependence sover-
eignty)
216. See supra n.104 and accompanying text (describing function of Single Market
and Single Economy in CSME).
217. See supra n.123 and accompanying text (discussing international sovereignty
as State's need to be recognized by other States).
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second question of why the CSME argument should be at the
forefront of the CCJ debate. Although the two arguments are
closely intertwined, their underlying values differ. The sover-
eignty argument is concerned with making the Caribbean States
whole by filling the gaps caused by a lack of self-confidence and
self-worth. The CSME argument, in contrast, is concerned with
the good and bad effects of globalization on Caribbean econo-
mies, and gaining more control over these economies. Observ-
ing the CSME argument, it seems to perform a double duty by
showing concern for both the economy and sovereignty. Thus,
this one argument covers both issues. The issues of self-worth
and confidence, however, appear to be lost in the type of sover-
eignty covered by the CSME, since interdependence sovereignty
only contains the issue of control, while domestic sovereignty in-
cludes both control and authority.2t 8 Such an argument as-
sumes, however, that controlling one's own economy will have
no effect on people's self-worth and confidence, which is hard to
believe. Granted, interdependence sovereignty is not as glamor-
ous or patriotic as domestic sovereignty, but it is sovereignty
nonetheless.
Importantly, the effects of globalization also stretch to a de-
veloping Nation's sovereignty. 2 1 9 International finance institu-
tions and industrialized countries have been noted to dictate
how developing countries should run their economies.22' This is
a direct threat to a developing country's interdependence sover-
eignty, and it is this problem that the CSME argument addresses.
Moreover, the effectiveness of sovereignty is directly related to a
State's economic power and resources,22 ' which are also within
the realm of the CSME argument. A kind of dependency, then,
is formed between the two arguments, given that sovereignty will
only be effective if the economic power of a State is strong.
Thus, while the sovereignty argument concerns itself with mak-
ing States whole and filling gaps, the CSME argument focuses on
218. See supra nn.121-22 and accompanying text (discussing issues of authority and
control in context of domestic and interdependence sovereignty).
219. See supra n.187 and accompanying text (discussing globalization's effect on
developing countries' sovereignty).
220. See supra nn.188-89 and accompanying text (discussing international finance
institutions' effect on developing countries).
221. See supra n.191 and accompanying text (discussing sovereignty's effectiveness
is dependent on economic power).
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sustaining this sovereignty's effectiveness, through its concern
for the economy and globalization. The CSME argument should
therefore take precedence over the CCJ debate, given its under-
lying value pertaining to both the economy and sovereignty.
CONCLUSION
The above quote by Jonathan Swift is most accurate; it is,
indeed, wise to keep issues of money in one's head and not in
one's heart.2 22 Sovereignty is undoubtedly important to any Na-
tion's existence. Without it, there is no way to define oneself, or
even respect oneself. Such an argument, however, is more of an
emotional plea, and does not deal with the pressing issues sur-
rounding Caribbean economies. In contrast, the CSME argu-
ment actually spans across both the economy and sovereignty of
the Caribbean. Thus, the more prudent CSME argument ad-
dresses the issues posed by both arguments. Given the ex-
panding world economy, it would therefore be more useful to
ignore the valuable argument of sovereignty and focus on the
CSME argument. This is not to suggest that sovereignty is to be
fully disregarded; it simply means that sovereignty should not be
at the forefront of the CCJ debate when the CSME argument
addresses the more important issue of the effects of an ex-
panding globalization on Caribbean economies and sovereignty.
Working within the context of the CCJ, the phenomenon of
globalization is no more than the proverbial elephant in the
room: people are aware of its existence but choose to ignore it.
Using an emotional plea, like the sovereignty argument, to deal
with this phenomenon will not be as effective as using the more
prudent approach of establishing the CSME. Thus, now is the
time to pull on the trunk of this elephant to show people that it
does exist, and that it can be quite big and nasty. Aside from the
fact that pulling on an elephant's trunk, in reality, would be a
bad idea, in the context of the CCJ, it simply means using one's
head to sustain one's heart.
222. See supra n.1 and accompanying text.
